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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INSTITUTIONS 
by  
Ece Handan Guleryuz  
Florida International University, 2012  
Miami, Florida  
Professor Cem Karayalcin, Major Professor  
This dissertation analyzes the effects of political and economic institutions on economic 
development and growth.  
The first essay develops an overlapping-generations political economy model to analyze 
the incentives of various social groups to finance human capital accumulation through 
public education expenditures. The contribution of this study to the literature is that it 
helps explain the observed differences in the economic growth performance of natural 
resource-abundant countries. The results suggest that the preferred tax rates of the 
manufacturers on one hand and the political coalition of manufacturers and landowners, 
on the other hand, are equal to the socially optimal tax rate. However, we show that 
owners of natural resources prefer an excessively high tax rate, which suppresses 
aggregate output to a suboptimal level.   
The second essay examines the relationship between the political influence of different 
social classes and public education spending in panel data estimation. The novel 
contribution of this paper to the literature is that I proxy the political power and influence 
of the natural resource owners, manufacturers, and landowners with macroeconomic 
indicators. The motivation behind this modeling choice is to substantiate the definition of 
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the political power of social classes with economic fundamentals. I use different 
governance indicators in the estimations to find out how different institutions mediate the 
overall impact of the political influence of various social classes on public education 
spending. The results suggest that political stability and absence of violence and rule of 
law are the important governance indicators.  
The third essay develops a counter argument to Acemoglu et al. (2010) where the thesis 
is that French institutions and economic reforms fostered economic progress in those 
German regions invaded by the Napoleonic armies. By providing historical data on 
urbanization rates used as proxies for economic growth, I demonstrate that similar 
different rates of economic growth were observed in the regions of France in the post-
Napoleonic period as well. The existence of different economic growth rates makes it 
hard to argue that the differences in economic performance in the German regions that 
were invaded by the French and those that were spared a similar fate follow from 
regional differences in economic institutions. 
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CHAPTER I 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The last three decades have witnessed the highly divergent economic performance of 
several natural resource abundant countries. During the period 1975 – 2007, the average 
growth rates of GDP per capita of Norway and Botswana were 2.77% and 4.46% 
respectively. On the other hand, in the same period, resource-rich Venezuela and Zambia 
experienced average rates of growth of -0.26% and -0.30% GDP per capita (Penn World 
Table, 2009). Hence, rather paradoxically, natural resource-abundant countries are among 
both the richest and the poorest countries in the world. Some resource-abundant countries 
have achieved high and sustainable economic growth; while others have ended up as 
economic growth disasters.1  
Thus, consider, for instance, Norway, one of the richest natural resource-abundant 
countries. In the late 1960s, after it discovered oil, Norway used its oil revenues to 
finance the education of a highly skilled labor force and high-technology industries 
(Gerlagh and Papyrakis, 2004). On the other hand, Venezuela is usually cited as the 
contrasting example to Norway. As a result of widespread corruption and the strong 
impact of the landowners on government policies, Venezuela has turned out to be an 
economic failure.  
The purpose of my study is to shed new light on the nexus between natural resource 
abundance and human capital accumulation from a political economy perspective. The 
present paper suggests that the effect of natural resource abundance on human capital 
                                                            
1 See van der Ploeg (2009) for a detailed overview. 
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accumulation is at least partially determined by the identity of the social groups that hold 
political power and the level of economic benefits these groups derive from a more 
educated labor force in a multi-sector economy. Here human capital constitutes the 
engine of economic growth and is complementary to both natural resources and physical 
capital. One consequence of this assumption is that not only the manufacturers but also 
the owners of natural resources support human capital accumulation financed through 
public education expenditures.   
If the manufacturers have the political power or join in a political coalition with the 
landowners, the implemented tax rates are equal to the socially optimal tax rate. If the 
landowners are in power, they prefer a level of expenditure on public education 
expenditure that is lower than the efficient level by choosing a tax rate smaller than the 
socially optimal one. There are two opposing factors affecting the landowners’ decision. 
Firstly, as the complementarity between human capital and land is low, an increase in 
human capital reduces the return to land as labor migrates from agriculture to the 
manufacturing and natural resources sectors. Secondly, since human capital accumulation 
increases the marginal return to labor, landowners also obtain an increase in their wage 
income with a rise in human capital accumulation. Whether landowners support financing 
of public education depends on the relative strengths of these two effects. When natural 
resource owners have the political authority, they prefer a tax rate higher than the socially 
optimal tax rate. The natural resource owners’ distortionary tax policy decreases the 
marginal return to physical capital because of the labor transfer from the manufacturing 
sector to the natural resources sector.  
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In short, the paper offers an alternative explanation as to why some natural resource 
abundant countries, such as Norway, succeed in attaining high levels of sustained 
economic growth, while others, such as Nigeria, fail to do so. The suggestion here is that 
in those natural resource abundant countries where manufacturers have a certain degree 
of political power, the tax policy chosen supports human capital accumulation through 
public education expenditures. On the other hand, in those natural resource abundant 
countries where political power is in the hands of landowners the support for public 
education is not as strong. Wherever the natural resource owners hold the political 
authority the tendency is to implement a distortionary tax policy designed to raise their 
returns from the natural resource stock as much as possible.  
The theoretical analysis in this paper thus presents a three-class economic conflict among 
the manufacturers, natural resource owners and landowners. Here we differ from other 
studies proposing mainly a two-class conflict between the manufacturers and landowners 
(Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2009), or between the landowners and workers.           
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature this paper 
stands on. Section 3 presents the general theoretical model, and Section 4 develops 
various political economy implications about human capital accumulation. Finally, 
Section 5 provides the conclusion.         
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The present paper mainly stands at the nexus of two strands in the literature. One of these 
attempts is to link economic growth and institutions, while the other looks at the 
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connection between natural resource abundance and economic growth. Both of these 
literatures are vast and it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them in detail. I will, 
therefore, focus on certain papers in the areas of natural resource abundance, human 
capital accumulation, economic growth and political economy that are closely related to 
the issues addressed in this paper. 
The relationship between economic growth and political decisions is emphasized in 
North’s seminal work. North (1981) argues that the political elite may not adopt growth-
enhancing policies, such as those promoting human capital accumulation, if these policies 
do not maximize the revenues of the political elite. The view of the policies adopted by 
the political elite preventing economic growth because of potential economic losses is 
consistent with the theory proposed in the current paper. In their 2000 and 2006 papers 
where they analyze the political roots of economic backwardness, Acemoglu and 
Robinson argue that the social groups which have political power, particularly landlords, 
may prevent technological developments and the adoption of growth-enhancing 
institutions if they see these as a threat to their political power and economic rents. In a 
related work, Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) analyze the circumstances under which an 
educated oligarchy invests in the human capital accumulation of the poor through 
education and how this affects democratization movements in a dynamic political 
economy model. I abstract from the dynamics of political power and the election 
mechanisms such as single-peaked preferences, median voter theorem, and strategic 
voting in sequential elections in this paper. Glaeser et al. (2004) focus on the relationship 
between human capital accumulation and institutional development, and find that human 
capital formation leads to the emergence of growth-enhancing political institutions.  
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The social class conflicts analyzed in the political economy setup here is derived from 
Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) and on the analysis done in Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
(2006) influential book “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.” In 
particular, the theoretical model analyzed in my paper follows from the multi–sector, 
multi–class model in Galor et al. (2009), which argues that inequality in the distribution 
of landownership negatively affects human capital accumulation. Unlike this latter work, 
my paper analyzes the effect of social class conflicts and the political power struggle on 
human capital accumulation policies in an economy that is abundant in natural resources.  
Certain aspects of the relationship between natural resource abundance and economic 
growth, commonly referred to as the “resource curse,” have been widely studied in 
literature. Torvik (2009) and van der Ploeg (2009) provide good overviews of the recent 
empirical and theoretical research on the resource curse. Nevertheless, there is still 
limited research done on the nexus between natural resource abundance and human 
capital accumulation, and most of these studies are empirical. Using a model with two 
sectors that incorporates the effects of both endogenous growth and reallocation of 
resources, Bravo–Ortega and De Gregorio (2002) argue that a high level of human capital 
can alleviate the negative effect of natural resources on economic growth rate. They find 
support for their argument empirically using panel data for the period 1970-1990. 
Birdsall et al. (2001) and Gylfason (2001) find a negative correlation between resource 
abundance and human capital accumulation. In contrast, Stijns (2006) finds a positive 
relationship between human capital formation and resource abundance in an empirical 
study.  He argues that Birdsall et al. (2001) and Gylfason (2001) reach biased results 
because of the questionable natural resource abundance indicators they used. Regarding 
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these conflicting empirical results, van der Ploeg (2009) states that the use of certain 
variables can create serious endogeneity problems.  
 
III. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL  
The theoretical setup is an overlapping-generations, small, open, natural resource 
abundant economy in the process of development. Natural resource abundance of a 
country is defined as the higher amount of subsoil resources compared to other countries. 
The prices of goods are normalized to one for simplicity. A single homogeneous good 
used for consumption and investment is produced in a manufacturing sector and an 
agriculture sector every period. There is also a natural resource sector which functions as 
an intermediate industry producing an input used in the manufacturing sector. The main 
inputs used to produce the final output are natural resources, physical capital, human 
capital, land and unskilled (raw) labor. In the economy under study, human capital is 
assumed to be the engine of modern economic growth. In every period, the stock of 
human capital is determined by the aggregate public investment in education in the 
preceding period.  
In period ݐ, the final output in the economy, ܳ௧, is defined by the aggregate output 
produced in the manufacturing sector, ܳ௧ெ, and in the agriculture sector, ܳ௧஺,   
ܳ௧ = ܳ௧ெ + ܳ௧஺                                                                                                      (1)   
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Natural Resource Sector  
The production in the natural resource sector takes place within a period according to a 
neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale, Cobb-Douglas production technology using 
natural resources and human capital as inputs. We define the output produced at time ݐ, 
ܳ௧ே, with the following equation,     
ܳ௧ே = ܨேሺ ௧ܰ, ܪ௧ேሻ = ௧ܰఉܪ௧ே	ሺଵିఉሻ = ܪ௧ே݊௧ఉ, ݊௧ ≡ ௧ܰ ܪ௧ே⁄ , ߚ	߳	ሺ0,1ሻ                 (2)   
where ௧ܰ is the natural resources stock (which is mainly unprocessed subsoil wealth such 
as oil, minerals etc.) and ܪ௧ே is the quantity of human capital (measured in efficiency 
units) employed in production at time ݐ. In the natural resource sector, producers operate 
in a perfectly competitive environment. Hence, the wage rate per worker, ݓ௧ே, and the 
rate of return to natural resources stock, ݒ௧, in period ݐ are expressed as the following:  
ݓ௧ே = ܨுேಿ ሺ ௧ܰ, ܪ௧ேሻ                                                                                               (3)  
ݒ௧ = ܨேேሺ ௧ܰ, ܪ௧ேሻ     
Moreover, the labor share in the natural resource sector is given by  
ݏ௧ுಿ = ܪ௧ேݓ௧ே                                                                                                        (4) 
The share of natural resources in the natural resource sector is   
ݏ௧ே = ߚܳ௧ே    
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Manufacturing Sector  
The production in the manufacturing sector occurs within a period according to a 
neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale, Cobb-Douglas production technology using 
physical capital, ܭ௧, human capital, ܪ௧ெ (measured in efficiency units), and the output of 
the natural resource sector, ܳ௧ே (from now on called the resource input), employed in 
production at time ݐ. The output produced at time ݐ, ܳ௧ெ, is  
ܳ௧ெ = ܨெሺܭ௧, ܪ௧ெ, ܳ௧ேሻ = ܭ௧ఈܪ௧ெሺఏሻܳ௧ேሺଵିఈିఏሻ	 ;         ߙ	߳	ሺ0,1ሻ  ,  ߠ	߳	ሺ0,1ሻ      (5)   
Physical capital depreciates fully after one period. In the manufacturing sector, producers 
operate in a perfectly competitive environment. The rate of return to physical capital, ܴ௧, 
the wage rate per worker, ݓ௧ெ, and the rate of return to the resource input, ߩ௧, in period ݐ, 
factor prices can be defined as:    
ܴ௧ = ܨ௄ெሺܭ௧, ܪ௧ெ, ܳ௧ேሻ                                                                                           (6) 
ݓ௧ெ = ܨுಾெ ሺܭ௧, ܪ௧ெ, ܳ௧ேሻ                                                                                                     
ߩ௧ = ܨொெಿ ሺܭ௧, ܪ௧ெ, ܳ௧ேሻ       
 
Agriculture Sector  
In the agriculture sector, the Cobb-Douglas production technology uses land, ܼ௧, and raw 
labor, ܮ௧, as inputs. Production occurs in a perfectly competitive environment as in the 
natural resource and manufacturing sectors. The output produced at time ݐ, ܳ௧஺, is  
ܳ௧஺ = ܨ஺ሺܼ௧, ܮ௧ሻ = ܼ௧ఊܮ௧ଵିఊ = ܮ௧ݖ௧ఊ; ݖ௧ ≡ ܼ௧ ܮ௧⁄  , ߛ	߳	ሺ0,1ሻ                                (7)   
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The rate of return to land, ݔ௧, and the wage rate per worker, ݓ௧஺ can be defined as  
ݔ௧ = ܨ௓஺ሺܼ௧, ܮ௧ሻ                                                                                                     (8)  
ݓ௧஺ = ܨ௅஺ሺܼ௧, ܮ௧ሻ       
 
Individuals, Preferences and Income  
A generation is a continuum of individuals of measure 1 born in every period. Both 
within and across generations, individuals are identical regarding their preferences and 
innate abilities. Nevertheless, they may differ from each other in terms of their wealth. 
Each individual lives for two periods, and has a single parent and a single child. The 
preferences of an individual ݅ of generation ݐ are defined over the second period 
consumption, ܿ௧ାଵ௜  , and a transfer to the offspring, ܾ௧ାଵ௜ , with a log-linear utility function  
௧ܷ௜ = ሺ1 − ܽሻ	݈݊	ܿ௧ାଵ௜ + ܽ ݈݊ ܾ௧ାଵ௜      ,     ܽ	߳	ሺ0,1ሻ                                                (9)   
Individuals acquire human capital in the first period of their lives. In the second period 
they join the labor-force, earn a wage income, and the returns to natural resources, 
physical capital, and land. They allocate their second period income between 
consumption and an income transfer to their children. Hence, an individual ݅ born in 
period ݐ is given an income transfer, ܾ௧௜, in the first period of life.  
Now, an individual ݅ born in period ݐ earns the competitive market wage ݓ௧ାଵ by joining 
the labor-force; she may also obtain income from the return on natural resources 
ownership, ݉௜ݒ௧ାଵ, where ݉௜ is agent ݅’s endowment of natural resources, from physical 
capital ownership, ሺ1 − ߬௧ሻܾ௧௜ܴ௧ାଵ, and from the return on land ownership, ݏ௜ݔ௧ାଵ, where 
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ݏ௜ is the quantity of land owned by agent ݅. In the current economic framework, workers 
do not own any natural resources, physical capital, or land. In the second period natural 
resource owners leave all the natural resources, and landowners leave all the land to their 
offspring. These assumptions preserve the social class structure over time.  
Now, we can define the individual’s second period income as the following,  
ݕ௧ାଵ௜ = ݓ௧ାଵ + ሺ1 − ߬௧ሻܾ௧௜ܴ௧ାଵ + ݉௜ݒ௧ାଵ + ݏ௜ݔ௧ାଵ                                           (10)    
where ݉௜ = ௧ܰ ߪ⁄ , and ௧ܰ  is the total stock of natural resources, ߪ	߳	ሺ0, 1ሻ is the fraction 
of natural resource owners in the economy among whom the natural resources stock is 
shared equally. In addition, ݏ௜ = ܼ௧ ߤ⁄ , where ܼ௧ is the total amount of land, and 
ߤ	߳	ሺ0, 1ሻ is the fraction of landowners in the economy who equally share all the land 
among themselves.2 
The individual ݅ born in period ݐ allocates second period income between consumption, 
ܿ௧ାଵ	௜ , and income transfers to the offspring, ܾ௧ାଵ௜ , in order to maximize his utility subject 
to the second period budget constraint, so  
ܿ௧ାଵ	௜ + ܾ௧ାଵ௜ ൑ ݕ௧ାଵ௜                                                                                              (11)     
The optimal transfer and consumption of the individual ݅ born in period ݐ can be shown 
to be the following:  
ܾ௧ାଵ௜ = ܽݕ௧ାଵ௜                                                                                                        (12) 
ܿ௧ାଵ௜ = ሺ1 − ܽሻݕ௧ାଵ௜                                                                                                           
 
                                                            
2 Note that ݉௜and ݏ௜ may be equal to zero depending on the social group that the individual belongs to. 
11 
 
Human Capital Accumulation and the Political Mechanism  
As mentioned above, individuals spend the first period of their two-period lives to 
acquire human capital. The political authority invests in human capital through public 
education. The amount of human capital accumulated increases with the real resources 
invested in public education. Here human capital accumulation is a strictly increasing, 
strictly concave function of real expenditures, ݁௧, on the education of a member of 
generation ݐ	 
݄௧ାଵ = ݄ሺ݁௧ሻ,                                                                                                    (13)    
where ݄௧ାଵ is the human capital of each individual of generation ݐ in period ݐ + 1, 
݄ሺ0ሻ = 1,   lim௘೟→଴శ ݄′ሺ݁௧ሻ = ∞   ,   lim௘೟→ஶ ݄′ሺ݁௧ሻ = 0.          
Thus, even if the real expenditure on public education is zero, individuals own one 
efficiency unit of human capital that forms the basic skills required for the natural 
resources sector and manufacturing sector to operate in every period.   
In this economic environment, there are four distinct groups of agents: Natural resource 
owners, manufacturers, landowners and workers. The across-group heterogeneity is 
mainly formed by the distinction that in period ݐ natural resource owners, manufacturers, 
landowners and workers get their incomes from the respective resources they own. This 
argument follows from a similar analysis in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, Chapter 8 
and Chapter 9). Because of the existence of heterogeneous social groups and their 
different economic incentives, policies for human capital accumulation change as the 
political authority changes hands among these groups. The social groups holding the 
political power have ultimate control on public education policies.   
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In order to finance public education for human capital accumulation, the current political 
authority collects a fraction ߬௧ of the income each group receives. The primary 
motivation here is that when a social group has political power, it chooses to invest in 
human capital accumulation if the benefits the group’s agents receive from a more 
educated labor force exceed the costs of financing public education by paying taxes from 
their bequest incomes and intergenerational income transfers.  
The main concentration of this paper is on the economic effects various social groups and 
political authorities have on human capital accumulation policies, but not on the political 
process by which the political authorities and coalitions come about. Therefore, note that 
the social group which holds the political authority or shares the political power with 
another group in a coalition is determined historically, and so this side of the political 
mechanism is exogenous in the theoretical model. I also ignore within social group 
conflicts in the analysis.    
 
IV. DIFFERENT POLITICAL AUTHORITY FORMATIONS  
Efficient Human Capital Accumulation Policies and Aggregate Output  
As it follows from equation (12), the aggregate level of intergenerational transfers in 
period ݐ is a fraction ܽ of the aggregate income ܳ௧. In order to finance public education, 
the political authority collects a fraction ߬௧ of income transfer as the tax revenues, so, to 
be saved for future consumption a fraction 1 − ߬௧ of the transfers is left. Now, the 
aggregate intergenerational transfers can be written as the following  
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ܽܳ௧ = ܾ                                                                                                               (14)  
where ܾ is defined as the total amount of bequest incomes. Then, the physical capital 
stock in period ݐ + 1 can be defined as,  
ܭ௧ାଵ = ሺ1 − ߬௧ሻ	ܽܳ௧ = ሺ1 − ߬௧ሻܾ	                                                                     (15)  
and the education expenditure per young individual in period ݐ, ݁௧ , is  
݁௧ = ߬௧ܽܳ௧ = ߬௧ܾ                                                                                                (16)    
Let us define ߜ௧ାଵே , ߜ௧ାଵெ , ߜ௧ାଵ஺  to be the numbers (and so fractions) of workers employed 
in the natural resources sector, in the manufacturing sector, and in the agriculture sector 
respectively. Then, the stock of human capital employed in natural resource sector in 
period ݐ + 1, ܪ௧ାଵே , can be defined as,  
ܪ௧ାଵே = ߜ௧ାଵே ݄ሺ݁௧ሻ = ߜ௧ାଵே ݄ሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻ                                                                    (17)   
The amount of natural resource stock is fixed over time at a level ܰ ൐ 0, so output in the 
natural resource sector in period ݐ + 1 is,  
ܳ௧ାଵே = ܰఉܪ௧ାଵே	ሺଵିఉሻ = ܰఉሾߜ௧ାଵே ݄ሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻሿଵିఉ ≡ ܳேሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ߜ௧ାଵே , ܰሻ		             (18)     
Similar to the case in natural resource sector, the stock of human capital employed in 
manufacturing sector in period ݐ + 1, ܪ௧ାଵெ , can be written as   
ܪ௧ାଵெ = ߜ௧ାଵெ ݄ሺ݁௧ሻ = ߜ௧ାଵெ 	݄ሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻ                                                                   (19)    
then output produced in the manufacturing sector can be written as   
ܳ௧ାଵெ = ܭ௧ାଵఈ ܪ௧ାଵெሺఏሻܳ௧ାଵேሺଵିఈିఏሻ                                                                             (20)  
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ܳ௧ାଵெ = ሾሺ1 − ߬௧ሻܽܳ௧ሿఈ	ሾߜ௧ାଵெ 	݄ሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻሿఏ	ൣܰఉሾߜ௧ାଵே ݄ሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻሿଵିఉ൧ሺଵିఈିఏሻ	    
ܳ௧ାଵெ ≡ ܳெሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ߜ௧ାଵே , ߜ௧ାଵெ , ܰሻ  
In agriculture sector the labor supply ܮ௧ାଵ (ܮ௧ାଵ = ߜ௧ାଵ஺ ሻ can also be expressed as 
ሺ1 − ߜ௧ାଵே − ߜ௧ାଵெ ሻ, and the land size is constant over time at a level ܼ ൐ 0. Thus, output 
in agriculture sector in period ݐ + 1 can be written as  
ܳ௧ାଵ஺ = ܼఊܮ௧ାଵଵିఊ = ܼఊሺߜ௧ାଵ஺ ሻଵିఊ = ܼఊሺ1 − ߜ௧ାଵே − ߜ௧ାଵெ ሻଵିఊ ≡ ܳ஺ሺ	ߜ௧ାଵே , ߜ௧ାଵெ , ܼሻ (21)   
Individuals are perfectly mobile between the manufacturing sector, natural resources 
sector and agriculture sector. Thus, they can earn the wage incomes ݄௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵெ , ݄௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵே  
or the wage ݓ௧ାଵ஺  by supplying ݄௧ାଵ efficiency units of labor to the manufacturing sector 
or natural resources sector, or one unit of labor to the agriculture sector respectively. The 
number of workers in the manufacturing sector,	ߜ௧ାଵெ ,and in natural resource sector, ߜ௧ାଵே , 
equalize the marginal products of workers in the three sectors under each political 
coalition. Therefore,  
݄௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵெ = ݄௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵே = ݓ௧ାଵ஺ = ݓ௧ାଵ                                                              (22)  
The fractions of workers employed by the manufacturing sector, natural resource sector 
and agriculture sector in period ݐ + 1, are uniquely determined with respect to the tax 
policy the political authority imposes under each political coalition:  
ߜ௧ାଵெ = ߜெሺܳ௧, ߬௧௝, ܰ, ܼሻ ;ߜ௧ାଵே = ߜேሺܳ௧, ߬௧௝, ܰ, ܼሻ ;  ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = ߜ஺ሺܳ௧߬௧௝, ܰ, ܼሻ (23)             
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In equation (23), ߬௧௝ refers to the tax rates imposed by different political coalitions. 
Further, given the natural resource stock, ܰ, and agricultural land size,	ܼ, in period ݐ + 1 
prices are uniquely determined by ܳ௧ and ߬௧௝ under each political coalition:     
ݓ௧ାଵ = ݓሺܳ௧,߬௧௝, ܰ, ܼሻ                                                                                       (24) 
ܴ௧ାଵ = ܴሺܳ௧, ߬௧௝, ܰ, ܼሻ                                                                                                    
ݒ௧ାଵ = ݒሺܳ௧, ߬௧௝, ܰ, ܼሻ   
ݔ௧ାଵ = ݔሺܳ௧, ߬௧௝, ܰ, ܼሻ   
ߩ௧ାଵ = ߩሺܳ௧, ߬௧௝, ܰ, ܼሻ   
Hence, the prices given in (24), and the employment shares given in (23) are moving 
endogenously with the specific tax policy each political coalition implements.   
The model predicts that given the aggregate income in period ݐ, ܽܳ௧, the level of natural 
resources stock, ܰ, and the amount of land, ܼ, there exists a unique tax rate, ߬௧∗, which 
maximizes the aggregate output, ܳ௧ାଵ, in period ݐ + 1. 
߬௧∗ ≡ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ	ܳ௧ାଵ     
Furthermore, the numbers of workers employed in the manufacturing 
sector,	ߜெ∗ሺܳ௧, ߬௧∗, ܰ, ܼሻ, and in the natural resources sector, ߜே∗ሺܳ௧, ߬௧∗, ܰ, ܼሻ, in period 
ݐ + 1 are uniquely determined with respect to ߬௧∗, satisfying the socially optimal labor 
distribution in the three sectors. Figure 1 demonstrates the aggregate output according to 
the human capital accumulation policy (tax policy) of the political authority. As depicted 
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in Figure 1, the socially optimal tax rate, ߬௧∗, achieves the maximum aggregate output and 
efficient public education at the point B.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The aggregate output with various tax policies under different political authority formations    
 
Manufacturers Have the Political Power  
Manufacturers comprise a fraction ߴ	߳	ሺ0,1ሻ of all individuals in the society. They do not 
own any natural resources and any land, so we can write the second period income 
function of a manufacturer as the following:  
ݕ௧ାଵெ = ݓ௧ାଵ + ሺ1 − ߬௧ெሻܾ௧ெܴ௧ାଵ                                                                                    (25)        
ݕ௧ାଵெ = ݓሺܳ௧, ߬௧ெ, ܰ, ܼሻ + ሺ1 − ߬௧ெሻܾ௧ெܴሺܳ௧, ߬௧ெ, ܰ, ܼሻ                                           
where ݓሺܳ௧, ߬௧ெ, ܰ, ܼሻ is the wage income, ܾ௧ெ is the portion of total bequest income that 
a manufacturer gets, and ܴሺܳ௧, ߬௧ெ, ܰ, ܼሻ is the rate of return to physical capital. When 
manufacturers hold the political power their main objective is to reach the highest level of 
ܳ௧ାଵ 
߬௧஺ ߬௧ெ஺ = ߬௧ெ = ߬௧∗ ߬௧ெே ߬௧ே 
ܣ 
ܤ ܥ
ܦ
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their income in the second period.3 Thus, they choose such a tax rate, ߬௧ெ, that maximizes 
each manufacturer’s income function in period ݐ + 1. Since manufacturers earn their 
income from wage and bequest transfers of physical capital ownership, ߬௧ெ also 
maximizes the manufacturing sector output. Therefore, manufacturers collect a fraction 
߬௧ெ of intergenerational income transfers (bequest incomes) as tax revenues in order to 
finance public education, so a fraction 1 − ߬௧ெ of the transfers is saved for future 
consumption. Since human capital is complementary with physical capital in the 
manufacturing sector, manufacturers get economic benefits from a more educated labor 
force, so they are in favor of human capital accumulation. 4 
  Proposition 1 When the manufacturers hold political power they support human capital 
accumulation through public education expenditure with a preferred tax rate ߬௧ெ.5 Hence,    
߬௧ெ = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔݕ௧ାଵெ   
In this subsection, it is demonstrated that the preferred tax rate from the point of view of 
the manufacturers, ߬௧ெ, is equal to the socially optimal tax rate that maximizes the 
aggregate output, ߬௧∗. Hence, as the manufacturers have the political power, the tax rate 
chosen to be implemented by them (߬௧ெ) is identical to the tax rate which achieves the 
efficient level of investment in public education ሺ߬௧∗ሻ. In addition to this, the evolution of 
the manufacturing sector output, ܳ௧ାଵெ , according to the tax policy implemented by the 
political authority of manufacturers will be identical to the graph of the aggregate output 
                                                            
3 This is equivalent to the utility maximization subject to the second period budget constraint explained in 
Section 3.4. 
 
4 For this statement, the calibration explanations and results can be seen in Section 4.7.   
 
5 A demonstration is provided in Section A.2 in the Appendix. 
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depicted in Figure 1. Therefore, under the political authority of manufacturers the 
maximized aggregate output and the efficient human capital accumulation level will be 
achieved again at point B.    
 Lemma 1 Suppose that ߬௧ெ is the tax rate preferred by manufacturers and maximizes the 
output of the manufacturing sector in period ݐ + 1, so   
߬௧ெ ≡ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔܳ௧ାଵெ = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔܳெሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ߜ௧ାଵே , ߜ௧ାଵெ , ܰሻ                                 (26) 
This tax rate is also equal to the socially optimal tax rate, ߬௧∗.  
Proof. As follows from (1), Appendix A.1 and from the envelope theorem  
߲ܳ௧ାଵ ߲߬௧ =⁄ ߲ܳெሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ߜ௧ାଵே , ߜ௧ାଵெ , ܰሻ ߲߬௧⁄                                                     (27)    
Moreover, since ߬௧∗ = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ	ܳ௧ାଵ, then ߲ܳெሺܳ௧, ߬௧∗, ߜ௧ାଵே , ߜ௧ାଵெ , ܰሻ ߲߬௧⁄ = 0, and so it 
follows from (20) that,  
ߜ௧ାଵெ ݓ௧ାଵெ ݄ᇱሺ߬௧∗ܽܳ௧ሻ + ߩ௧ାଵߜ௧ାଵே ݓ௧ାଵே ݄ᇱሺ߬௧∗ܽܳ௧ሻ = ܴ௧ାଵ  
Therefore,  
߬௧∗ = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔܳெሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ߜ௧ାଵே , ߜ௧ାଵெ , ܰሻ =
ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔሾሺ1 − ߬௧ሻܽܳ௧ሿఈ	ሾߜ௧ାଵெ 	݄ሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻሿఏ	ൣܰఉሾߜ௧ାଵே ݄ሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻሿଵିఉ൧ሺଵିఈିఏሻ                (28) 
Hence, ߬௧∗ = ߬௧ெ.      
Thus, under the political authority of manufacturers the socially optimal level of the 
aggregate output is also achieved.  
Now also, following from (6), (20) and Section A.2 in the Appendix; ሺ1 − ߬௧ሻܽܳ௧ܴ௧ାଵ =
ߙܳ௧ାଵெ   
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Then, ሺ1 − ߬௧ሻܴ௧ାଵ = ߙܳ௧ାଵெ /ሺܽܳ௧ሻ, and so  ߬௧∗ = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔሺ1 − ߬௧ሻܴ௧ାଵ  
Hence, ߬௧∗ also maximizes the after tax returns from physical capital ownership.   
 
Landowners Have the Political Power  
Landowners set up a fraction ߤ	߳	ሺ0, 1ሻ of all individuals in the total population, and they 
equally share the entire land in the economy in all periods. Landowners do not hold 
physical capital and they do not own any natural resources. Then, we can write the 
second period income function of a landowner as;  
ݕ௧ାଵ஺ = ݓ௧ାଵ + ݏ஺ݔ௧ାଵ                                                                                        (29)  
where ݏ஺ is the return on land ownership. 6 When the landowners have the ultimate 
political power they will implement a tax rate that maximizes the income of a landowner 
in period ݐ + 1. Landowners do not obtain any earnings from the ownership of physical 
capital and natural resources with which human capital is used in the industrial 
production. Therefore, an increase in human capital will reduce the return to land as a 
consequence of labor migration from the agriculture sector to the natural resources and 
manufacturing sectors, so depending on the effect of returns on land ownership 
landowners want to retain as much unskilled labor as they can on the land. On the other 
hand, following from (22) since human capital accumulation increases the marginal 
returns to labor in the manufacturing and natural resource sectors, and the marginal 
                                                            
6 Landowners might get economic benefits from human capital accumulation due to physical capital and 
natural resource ownerships, labor supply to the manufacturing sector and natural resources sector, and the 
provision of public goods. Nevertheless, in the consideration of the landowners’ income function in period   
these possibilities are excluded from the analysis.   
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products of workers are equalized across the three sectors landowners also obtain an 
increase in their wage income with a rise in human capital accumulation. Under their 
political authority, these two opposing effects make the landowners prefer a tax rate, ߬௧஺, 
which is greater than zero but lower than the tax rate chosen by the manufacturers,	߬௧ெ, 
and so lower than the socially optimal tax rate, ߬௧∗. Thus, the tax policy chosen by the 
landowners does not achieve the efficient public education investment level, and the 
aggregate output obtained under the political authority of landowners remains at a 
suboptimal level compared to the maximum level of aggregate output. 7 The lower 
aggregate output and the tax policy preferred by the landowners can be shown with point 
A in Figure 1. Note in Section A.1 in the Appendix, the profit maximization condition of 
the manufacturers’ second period income function is defined as, 
ቊ൜ሾሺ1 − ߙ − ߚ + ߙߚ + ߠߚሻ݄ᇱሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵሿ − ሾߙሺ1 − ߬௧ெሻିଵሿ +
ߠߜݐ+1ܯ−1߲ߜܯܳݐ,	 ߬ݐܯ,	ܰ,	 ܼ	 ߲߬ݐܯ	+1−ߚ1−ߙ−ߠߜݐ+1ܰ−1߲ߜܰܳݐ,	 ߬ݐܯ,	ܰ,	 ܼ	 ߲߬ݐܯ	
ߠߜݐ+1ܯ−1+ߙܾݐܯ	ܽܳݐ−1−ߠߜݐ+1ܯ−2߲ߜܯܳݐ,	߬ݐܯ,	ܰ,	ܼ	߲߬ݐܯ	=0	  
The expression ሾߙܾ௧ெሺ	ܽܳ௧ሻିଵሿ refers to the bequest incomes that the manufacturers earn 
from physical capital ownership. The landowners do not own physical capital, and so 
they do not obtain any earnings from capital ownership. Since human capital is 
complementary to physical capital making it more productive when used together, 
                                                            
7 This statement is discussed in Section A.3 in the Appendix. 
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employing more human capital in the manufacturing sector increases the returns to 
physical capital. Therefore, manufacturers will prefer a higher tax rate than the tax rate 
landowners prefer. Hence,  
 ߬௧஺ ൏ ߬௧ெ                                                                                                           (30)             
 
Natural Resource Owners Have the Political Power   
The natural resource owners set up a fraction ߪ	߳	ሺ0,1ሻ among the total population. 
Natural resource owners equally own the entire natural resource stock, and they also 
obtain returns from physical capital ownership, but they do not own any land. Thus, we 
can define the second period income function of a natural resource owner as   
ݕ௧ାଵே = ݓ௧ାଵ + ሺ1 − ߬௧ேሻܾ௧ேܴ௧ାଵ + ݉ேݒ௧ାଵ                                                       (31)  
where ܾ௧ே is the portion of total bequest income that a natural resource owner gets, and 
݉ே is the  endowment of natural resource stock a natural resource owner owns and ݒ௧ାଵ 
is the rate of return to natural resources stock as defined in section 3.4 and in equation (3) 
respectively.  
As the natural resource owners have the political power, their aim will be to obtain the 
highest level of their second period income. Thus, in order to finance human capital 
accumulation through public education, they will implement a tax policy which 
maximizes their income in period ݐ + 1. For a given natural resource stock level, in order 
to increase the rate of return to natural resource stock, ݒ௧ାଵ- and equivalently the income 
earned from natural resources ownership,	݉ேݒ௧ାଵ, in equation (31), and so maximize 
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their second period income, natural resource owners will want to employ a higher number 
of “skilled” workers than the number that is sufficient to achieve the socially optimal 
aggregate output. Hence, natural resource owners will favor a high amount of human 
capital accumulation, and to finance this high level of human capital accumulation 
natural resource owners prefer a rather high tax rate, ߬௧ே.  
Nevertheless, employing the number of skilled workers higher than the level required to 
produce the socially optimal aggregate output in the natural resources sector indicates a 
labor transfer from the manufacturing sector to the natural resources sector, reducing the 
marginal product of physical capital. On the whole, the excessively high tax rate 
preferred by the political authority of natural resource owners has a suppressing impact 
on the aggregate output in the economy. The lower aggregate output level obtained with 
this high tax rate is depicted at the point D in Figure 1. In order to maximize their second 
period income, when the natural resource owners have the political authority they prefer a 
tax rate, ߬௧ே, which is higher than the socially optimal tax rate, ߬௧∗, and which leads to a 
suboptimal aggregate output level.8 Hence, the tax rate, ߬௧ே, maximizing the second 
period income of natural resource owners also satisfies the following condition,  
߬௧ே ൐ ߬௧ெ = ߬௧∗ ൐ 	 ߬௧஺                                                                                           (32)    
  
 
 
                                                            
8 The calibration explanations and results validating the statements in the Proposition 3 can be seen in 
Section 4.7. A related discussion is provided in Section A.4 in the Appendix.    
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Political Coalition of Manufacturers and Natural Resource Owners  
Manufacturers and natural resource owners can form a political coalition against a 
possible political authority of landowners. As explained in Section 4.3 and shown in 
Section 4.7, under the political authority of landowners, landowners want to keep almost 
the whole labor force in the agriculture sector, and so the tax rate they implement under 
their political authority is rather low. The very low tax rate and employing low numbers 
of skilled workers in the manufacturing and natural resources sectors are not preferred by 
manufacturers and natural resource owners since these will make both social groups 
economically worse off. As they set up a political coalition, their primary objective will 
be to maximize their joint income in period ݐ + 1. The coalition’s joint income function 
is defined as an equal – weighted summation of each social group’s second period 
income function, revealing the condition that the two groups share the political power 
equally in the coalition, as the following                                                                                                       
ݕ௧ାଵெே = ݕ௧ାଵெᇱ + ݕ௧ାଵேᇱ                                                                                              (33) 
ݕ௧ାଵெே = ሾݓ௧ାଵ + ሺ1 − ߬௧ெேሻܾ௧ெܴ௧ାଵሿ +	 ሾݓ௧ାଵ + ሺ1 − ߬௧ெேሻܾ௧ேܴ௧ାଵ + ݉ேݒ௧ାଵሿ	           
where ߬௧ெே is the tax rate chosen by manufacturers–natural resource owners political 
authority. Since both manufacturers and natural resource owners get economic benefits 
from human capital accumulation and in order to maximize their joint second period 
income, so become economically better off than they would under a landowners political 
authority, they will implement the positive tax rate,	߬௧ெே, that is higher than the 
manufacturers’ preferred tax rate, ߬௧ெ, and lower than the natural resource owners’ 
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preferred tax rate,	߬௧ே, but maximizes their joint income.9 The simulation results in 
Section 4.7 imply that the tax rate, ߬௧ெே, satisfies the following condition     
߬௧ே ൐ ߬௧ெே ൐ 	 ߬௧ெ = ߬௧∗ ൐ 	 ߬௧஺		                                                                            (34) 
Therefore, in order to maximize the second period joint income function, both 
manufacturers and natural resource owners will be content to a tax policy that is not 
originally preferred under either social group’s political authority. Nonetheless, the tax 
rate,	߬௧ெே, does not achieve the efficient level of public education, and so the efficient 
human capital accumulation level from the society’s point of view. Thus, this tax policy 
does not achieve the socially optimal aggregate output. The combination of the preferred 
tax rate,	߬௧ெே, and the aggregate output obtained with this tax policy is shown at the point 
C in Figure 1.   
 
Political Coalition of Manufacturers and Landowners  
Manufacturers and landowners may have an incentive to form a political coalition to 
protect themselves from the adverse economic effects of the political authority of natural 
resource owners and its distortionary tax policy. The natural resource owners support 
human capital accumulation mainly because they employ skilled workforce in the natural 
resources sector. However, under the political authority of natural resource owners an 
excessively high tax rate,	߬௧ே, is implemented to finance human capital accumulation 
through public education expenditures, and furthermore there occurs a substantial labor 
migration from the manufacturing sector to the natural resources sector, so this drastic 
                                                            
9 The calibration explanations and results validating this statement can be seen in Section 4.7.    
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decrease in employment level in the manufacturing sector suppresses the incomes of 
manufacturers making them economically worse off. Furthermore,	߬௧ே is a much higher 
tax rate than the preferred tax rate by landowners, ߬௧஺, which is even lower than the 
socially optimal tax rate, ߬௧∗. When manufacturers and landowners form a political 
coalition, their main aim will be to obtain the highest amount of their joint income in 
period ݐ + 1. The coalition’s joint income function can be defined as an equally weighted 
summation of each social group’s second period income function since the two groups 
share the political power equally. Hence, we can define the coalition’s joint income 
function in period ݐ + 1 as the following,  
ݕ௧ାଵெ஺ = ݕ௧ାଵெᇱ + ݕ௧ାଵ஺ᇱ                                                                                              (35) 
ݕ௧ାଵெ஺ = ሾݓ௧ାଵ + ሺ1 − ߬௧ெ஺ሻܾ௧ெܴ௧ାଵሿ +	ሾݓ௧ାଵ + ݏ஺ݔ௧ାଵሿ    
where ߬௧ெ஺ is the tax rate that maximizes the second period joint income of manufacturers 
and landowners. The sensitivity analysis results in Section 4.7 show that the tax 
rate,	߬௧ெ஺, is below the very high tax rate preferred by natural resource owners, and in the 
case of a political coalition of manufacturers and landowners, the preferred tax rate, ߬௧ெ஺, 
is equal to the tax rate chosen by manufacturers, ߬௧ெ, and so also it is equal to the socially 
optimal tax rate, ߬௧∗, which achieves the maximum aggregate output level as demonstrated 
at point B in Figure 1. Hence, the simulation results imply the following10,  
߬௧ே ൐ ߬௧ெே ൐ ߬௧ெ஺ = 	 ߬௧ெ = ߬௧∗ ൐ 	 ߬௧஺                                                                  (36)   
 
 
                                                            
10 The calibration explanations and results validating this statement can be seen in Section 4.7.  
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Sensitivity Analysis 
In all the simulations total population is equalized to 100 to get plausible numerical 
results, and for efficiency units of human capital the following function is used;  
݄௧ାଵ = ݄ሺ݁௧ሻ = ݄ሺ߬௧ܾሻ = 1 + ሺ߬௧ܾሻ଴.ହ   
The initial parameter values used in the simulations are as the following:  
ܾ = ܽܳ௧ = 10 ; ߙ = 0.3 ;	ߚ = 0.6 ; ߠ = 0.4 ; ߛ = 0.6 ; ௧ܰ = ௧ܰାଵ = ܰ = 10 ;  
ܼ௧ = ܼ௧ାଵ = ܼ = 5 ; ܾ௧ெ = 0.15 ; ܾ௧ே = 0.133 ; ߪ = 30 ;	ߤ = 20 ; ߴ = 40   
In all simulations the following two conditions are satisfied,  
(1)  
డொ೟శభಾ
డఋ೟శభಾ
= డொ೟శభಿడఋ೟శభಿ =
డொ೟శభಲ
డఋ೟శభಲ
 , which refers to the condition of wage rate equalization 
across sectors in equation (22), ݄௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵெ = ݄௧ାଵݓ௧ାଵே = ݓ௧ାଵ஺ = ݓ௧ାଵ.    
(2) ߜ௧ାଵெ + ߜ௧ାଵே + ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 100         
Hence, using the above parameter values and taking into account the specified conditions, 
under different political coalitions the following calibration results are obtained:   
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Table 1.Simulation Results under Different Political Coalitions 
Political 
Authority 
Tax Rate ࢾ࢚ା૚ࡹ  ࢾ࢚ା૚ࡺ  ࢾ࢚ା૚࡭  ࡽ࢚ା૚ 
Socially 
Optimal 
߬௧∗ = 0.362315 51.0557 39.2914 9.6529 40.9107 
Manufacturers ߬௧ெ
= 0.362315 
51.0557 39.2914 9.6529 40.9107 
Natural 
Resource 
Owners 
߬௧ே = 0.844238 37.4938 52.0187 10.4875 32.8045 
Landowners ߬௧஺ = 0.132704 0.870404 0.952376 98.1772 20.5046 
Manufacturers-
Natural 
Resource 
Owners 
߬௧ெே
= 0.573543 
47.7302 42.7966 9.4732 39.5818 
Manufacturers- 
Landowners 
߬௧ெ஺
= 0.362315 
51.0557 39.2914 9.6529 40.9107 
 
The following sensitivity analysis investigates how preferred tax rates and endogenously 
determined labor shares change when some of parameter values change under various 
coalitions.  
 Table 2.Sensitivity Analysis under Manufacturers’ Political Authority     
α = 0.5 ߬௧ெ = 0.205907 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 43.1165 ߜ௧ାଵே = 44.5706 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 12.3129 
α = 0.1 ߬௧ெ = 	0.684588 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 60.721 ߜ௧ାଵே = 32.4023 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 6.87632 
θ = 0.6 ߬௧ெ = 	0.417286 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 79.609 ߜ௧ାଵே = 16.4693 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 3.92164 
θ = 0.2 ߬௧ெ = 	0.296658 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 22.6761 ߜ௧ାଵே = 61.5415 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 15.7824 
β = 0.8 ߬௧ெ = 	0.330983 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 67.6948 ߜ௧ାଵே = 14.2635 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 18.0417 
β = 0.4 ߬௧ெ = 	0.390983 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 25.5593 ߜ௧ାଵே = 71.2763 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 3.16437 
γ = 0.8 ߬௧ெ = 0.362315 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 54.7539 ߜ௧ାଵே = 41.6492 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 3.59691 
γ = 0.3 ߬௧ெ = 0.362315 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 28.9062 ߜ௧ାଵே = 24.458 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 46.6357 
N = 20 ߬௧ெ = 0.362315 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 42.8632 ߜ௧ାଵே = 50.8861	 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 6.25071 
N = 5 ߬௧ெ = 0.362315 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 57.081 ߜ௧ାଵே = 28.7786 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 14.1403 
Z = 25 ߬௧ெ = 0.362315 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 35.4284 ߜ௧ାଵே = 28.977  ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 35.5946 
Z = 3 ߬௧ெ = 0.362315 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 53.2834 ߜ௧ାଵே = 40.715  ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 6.00158 
 
When ߙ increases the marginal productivity of physical capital rises relative to the human 
capital and natural resource employed in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, the 
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manufacturers prefer a lower tax rate compared to the tax rate when the value of ߙ is 
lower, and also there will be a labor transfer from the manufacturing sector to the natural 
resource and agriculture sectors. When θ rises, marginal returns from human capital 
increase relative to physical capital and natural resource employed in the manufacturing 
sector. Hence, manufacturers now prefer a higher tax rate, and there will be a labor 
transfer from the natural resource and agriculture sectors to the manufacturing sector. 
When β increases the marginal productivity of natural resource stock rises relative to 
human capital in the natural resource sector. The increase in the marginal productivity of 
natural resource stock has a small decreasing effect on the manufacturers’ preferred tax 
rate, and it will bring about a labor migration from natural resource sector to the 
manufacturing and agriculture sectors. When γ rises marginal returns from land increase 
relative to unskilled labor employed in the agriculture sector. The increase in marginal 
returns from land does not have any effect on the level of the tax rate chosen by 
manufacturers, though it creates a labor transfer from agriculture sector to manufacturing 
and natural resource sectors.  
As the amount of natural resource stock increases, this effect does not change the 
manufacturers’ preferred tax rate. Since now there is more natural resource stock to 
supply with human capital in the natural resource sector, and natural resource is an input 
used in manufacturing sector there will be a labor transfer from manufacturing and 
agriculture sectors to natural resource sector. As the amount of land increases, this does 
not change manufacturers’ preferred tax rate. Since now there is more land to supply with 
raw labor and the labor migration is free across sectors, there will be a worker transfer 
from manufacturing and natural resource sectors to agriculture sector.      
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Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis under Resource Owners’ Political Authority 
α = 0.5 ߬௧ே = 0.790478 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 21.8404 ߜ௧ାଵே = 64.8675 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 13.2922 
α = 0.1 ߬௧ே = 	0.963519 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 54.6216 ߜ௧ାଵே = 37.9718 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 	7.406654 
θ = 0.6 ߬௧ே = 	0.737921 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 74.2848 ߜ௧ାଵே = 21.2805 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 4.4347 
θ = 0.2 ߬௧ே = 	0.907133 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 12.5831 ߜ௧ାଵே = 72.967 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 14.4499 
β = 0.8 ߬௧ே = 	0.62967 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 64.7119 ߜ௧ାଵே = 15.901 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 	19.3871 
β = 0.4 ߬௧ே = 	0.971226 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 6.91574 ߜ௧ାଵே = 90.4025 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 2.68173 
γ = 0.8 ߬௧ே = 0.838916 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 40.943 ߜ௧ାଵே = 55.2206 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 	3.83642 
γ = 0.3 ߬௧ே = 0.889706 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 17.4031 ߜ௧ାଵே = 31.5812 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 	51.0157 
N = 20 ߬௧ே = 0.904211 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 25.1397 ߜ௧ାଵே = 68.1107 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 6.74956 
N = 5 ߬௧ே = 0.781715 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 47.7192 ߜ௧ାଵே = 37.0536 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 	15.2272 
Z = 25 ߬௧ே = 0.872229 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 23.5285 ߜ௧ାଵே = 38.2374  ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 38.2341 
Z = 3 ߬௧ே = 0.84102 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 39.5423 ߜ௧ାଵே = 53.928  ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 6.52965 
 
When ߙ increases the marginal productivity of physical capital rises relative to the human 
capital and natural resource employed in the manufacturing sector. Since the natural 
resource owners own physical capital they now prefer a lower tax rate, and there occurs a 
labor transfer from the manufacturing sector to the natural resource and agriculture 
sectors. When θ rises, marginal returns from human capital increase relative to physical 
capital and natural resource employed in the manufacturing sector. Thus, natural resource 
owners now prefer a lower tax rate. Yet, because of the unconstrained labor migration 
across sectors, there will be a labor transfer from the natural resource and agriculture 
sectors to the manufacturing sector. When β	 increases the marginal productivity of 
natural resource stock rises relative to human capital in the natural resource sector. The 
increase in the marginal productivity of natural resource reduces the tax rate preferred by 
the natural resource owners, and it will bring about a labor migration from natural 
resource sector to the manufacturing and agriculture sectors. As γ	rises marginal returns 
from land increase relative to unskilled labor employed in the agriculture sector. The 
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increase in marginal returns from land has a small reducing effect on the natural resource 
owners’ preferred tax rate, though it creates a labor transfer from agriculture sector to 
manufacturing and natural resource sectors.   
When the amount of natural resource stock increases since now there is more natural 
resource stock to supply with human capital in the natural resource sector, natural 
resource owners prefer a higher tax rate, and there occurs a labor migration from 
manufacturing and agriculture sectors to the natural resource sector. As the amount of 
land in production increases since there is more land to supply with unskilled workers, 
and the wage rates across sectors are equalized through free labor migration, there will be 
an employment transfer from the manufacturing and natural resource sectors to the 
agriculture sector.      
Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis under Manufacturers-Resource Owners Coalition    
α = 0.5 ߬௧ெே = 0.408029 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 38.4396 ߜ௧ାଵே = 49.673 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 11.8874 
α = 0.1 ߬௧ெே = 	0.834666 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 59.2746 ߜ௧ାଵே = 33.8762 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 6.84913 
θ = 0.6 ߬௧ெே = 	0.537046 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 78.4471 ߜ௧ାଵே = 17.5973 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 3.95563 
θ = 0.2 ߬௧ெே = 	0.614792 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 19.4477 ߜ௧ାଵே = 66.1485 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 14.4038 
β = 0.8 ߬௧ெே = 	0.443004 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 67.1516 ߜ௧ାଵே = 14.6854 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 18.1631 
β = 0.4 ߬௧ெே = 	0.674599 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 20.0516 ߜ௧ାଵே = 77.1866 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 2.76186 
γ = 0.8 ߬௧ெே = 0.574198 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 51.117 ߜ௧ାଵே = 45.3386 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 3.54433 
γ = 0.3 ߬௧ெே = 0.566046 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 27.4378 ߜ௧ାଵே = 26.8053 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 45.757 
N = 20 ߬௧ெே = 0.616633 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 38.3406 ߜ௧ାଵே = 55.6092 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 6.05017 
N = 5 ߬௧ெே = 0.535891 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 54.8998 ߜ௧ାଵே = 31.1079 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 13.9923 
Z = 25 ߬௧ெே = 0.569072 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 33.3379 ߜ௧ାଵே = 31.6113 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 35.0508 
Z = 3 ߬௧ெே = 0.573953 ߜ௧ାଵெ = 49.7765 ߜ௧ାଵே = 44.3361 ߜ௧ାଵ஺ = 5.88739 
 
Under the political coalition of manufacturers and natural resource owners, the directions 
of labor transfer are the same as in the manufacturers’ political authority and natural 
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resource owners’ political authority. From the point of view of manufacturers, when θ 
rises since now manufacturers own natural resource stock and obtain income returns from 
natural resources ownership, as in the case of political authority of natural resource 
owners, the coalition members prefer a lower tax rate.  
The sensitivity analysis results for the cases of the aggregate output and the 
manufacturers – landowners coalition are the same as the results of political authority of 
manufacturers. These simulation conclusions are consistent with the theoretical model.  
Under the political authority of landowners, the same parameter changes which have 
been observed in other coalitions do not have any effect on the landowners’ preferred tax 
rate and on the endogenous allocation of labor shares. Only the second period income of 
landowners increases when γ or the amount of land, ܼ, rise.     
 
V. CONCLUSION  
Chapter one proposes a theoretical model about the relationship between natural resource 
abundance and human capital accumulation from a political economy perspective, unlike 
most of the existing studies which mainly focus on either economic effects of natural 
resource abundance on economic growth, or rent–seeking activities. The analysis 
suggests that the ultimate impact of the natural resource abundance on economic growth 
and on the accumulation of human capital depends on which social group(s) holds the 
political power in the society and on their preferred tax policy to finance human capital 
accumulation through public education expenditures.   
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First the socially optimal tax rate that achieves the efficient human capital accumulation 
level and maximum aggregate output is found. Then, public education policies under 
different political economy formations are investigated. Under each political coalition, 
the second period aggregate output and labor shares in the three sectors are endogenously 
changing with the unique tax policy each political coalition imposes. When the 
landowners hold the political authority, mainly as a consequence of a substantial 
reduction in the return from land which is caused by the increase in human capital, 
landowners favor human capital accumulation at a rather low degree. When the 
manufacturers have political power under either their own political authority or in a 
coalition with the landowners, since human capital is complementary to both physical 
capital and natural resources stock, and also the natural resource output is used as a factor 
of production in the manufacturing sector, the tax policies of these two political 
formations become the same with the socially optimal tax policy.   
On the other hand, when the natural resource owners hold the ultimate political power, 
they want to get the full advantage of the complementarity between human capital and 
natural resources stock, having a rent – seeking point of view. In order to extract the 
highest possible return from the natural resources stock, they prefer an excessively high 
tax rate which causes the aggregate output, and so economic growth to be at suboptimal 
levels. Although the political coalition of manufacturers and natural resource owners 
implement a lower tax rate, it does not still completely remedy the distortionary tax effect 
hurting aggregate output and economic growth. Hence, even though natural resource 
owners favor human capital, their preferred tax rates diminish aggregate output which 
leads to the less funds available for human capital accumulation in the future generations.  
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The political economy analysis proposed in this paper implies a multi – social class 
economic conflict among the natural resource owners, manufacturers and landowners, 
and provides an answer for the highly differentiated economic performances of the 
natural resource abundant countries.    
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CHAPTER II 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The Industrial Revolution marked the start of a long series of social and economic 
transformations leading to substantial divergence across countries in terms of income per 
capita, economic development, and political and economic institutions. The period of 
industrialization both intensified social class stratification by creating new classes and 
increased the demand for human capital, a complementary factor of production to 
physical capital. Because of credit market imperfections, public education spending has 
become the primary tool for human capital accumulation to maintain sustainable 
economic growth (Galor et al., 2009, and Lagerlof and Tangeras, 2008). Nonetheless, 
human capital may not be as beneficial for some sectors in the economy, and the social 
classes who operate in these sectors as the owners of primary factors of production would 
not support human capital accumulation through public education. For instance, Galor et 
al. (2009) argue that given the low level of complementarity between human capital and 
land, increases in human capital reduce the return to land as labor migrates from the 
agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector. When they have political power the 
landowners would choose to invest little, if at all, in public education unless they also 
earn returns from the industrial sector.  
The main purpose of Chapter two is to examine the association between public education 
spending, and the economic power and political influence of various social classes. 
Furthermore, as political influence is mediated through political institutions, we explore 
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how different governance indicators affect the overall impact of the political influence of 
social classes on public education spending.  
The choice of sectors of production and social class stratification are derived from the 
multi-sector, multi-class models in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), and Galor et al. 
(2009). Here we model three sectors: the natural resources, manufacturing, and 
agricultural sectors. Hence, the social classes whose economic power and political 
influence on public education spending are investigated are the natural resource owners, 
manufacturers and landowners.  
Certain aspects of the link between economic sectors and growth have been analyzed in 
detail in the literature. Matsuyama (1992) examined the relationship between agricultural 
productivity and economic growth in a two-sector model, and argued that agricultural 
productivity has a positive effect on economic growth in a closed economy, but in the 
case of a small, open economy there is a negative relationship between agricultural 
productivity and economic growth. In his model, he does not differentiate between an 
agriculture sector and a natural resource sector. Lagerlof and Tangeras (2008) analyze the 
trade-off between rent seeking activities such as resource competition or land conquest 
and productive activities such as trade or manufacturing which use human capital as a 
factor of production, and show that an increase in the availability of natural resources 
increases rent seeking activities and reduces human capital productivity, and is harmful 
for economic growth in the key takeoff period. Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) explore 
in a political economy model the conditions under which the educated oligarchy chooses 
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to invest in the education of the poor and so initiate a transition to democracy by 
integrating the educated poor into the political participation process.  
Empirical studies on the determinants of public education spending, such as Busemeyer 
(2007), examine the determinants of public education spending in 21 member countries 
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in a pooled 
time-series analysis. The control variables used include the degree of tax revenue 
decentralization, veto index, and cabinet shares of social democrats, Christian democrats, 
and conservatives. In a study of the determinants of public education spending in the 
United States, Poterba (1997) highlights the importance of the effect of demographic 
composition on the level of per-child education spending.  
The main results we obtain in what follows are that the political influence of natural 
resource owners and landowners has a direct negative effect on public education 
spending, whereas the political power of manufacturers exerts a positive one. Moreover, 
the quality of different dimensions of governance and institutions plays a significant role 
in determining the overall net effect of the political influence of different social classes 
on public education spending. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the data set and the econometric strategy. Section 3 discusses estimation results, 
and section 4 presents concluding remarks.   
 
II. ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY AND DATA DETAILS  
The main hypothesis proposed in this paper follows from the multi-social class 
theoretical model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Social groups are classified 
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according to the type of activity from which they generate their income and their 
ownership of factors of production in different sectors.  As a result, economic interests 
and preferences of different social groups diverge. As one social class’s economic 
contribution to aggregate output increases, that class gains in political power relative to 
other groups, and social and economic policy decisions increasingly reflect that group’s 
economic interests. Therefore relative economic contribution to the aggregate output 
maps into relative political influence in the society.     
One important question for empirical work is the choice of a metric to measure 
the political power of a given social class. The majority of the papers in the literature that 
try to proxy the political power of social classes use the political party left-right spectrum 
variables from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI 2009) (Beck et al., 2009). 
However, as the DPI 2009 codebook authors state, the data sources reveal very little 
information on party platforms, social groups supporting these parties, and agendas 
regarding economic policy. In what follows, I use instead a number of macroeconomic 
indicators to proxy the influence social classes may bring to bear in the political arena. 
Specifically, total natural resource rents, manufacture exports and agriculture value added 
(as shares of GDP) are adopted as proxy variables to measure the political influence of 
the natural resource owners, manufacturers, and landowners, respectively. The 
motivation behind this choice is to use the mapping from income to political power. 
Further, as political institutions mediate between political power and political 
outcomes, to show the mediating effect of political institutions I use interaction variables 
of different governance indicators with proxies of political power in the empirical 
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estimation. A similar method is followed in the literature on natural resources and 
economic growth. For instance, Mehlum et al. (2006), Boschini et al. (2007) and 
Brunnschweiler (2008) use in their empirical models the interactions between various 
natural resource measures and institutional quality indicators to estimate the total effect 
of natural resource abundance on economic development. The total natural resource rents 
(as a percentage of the GDP), which is assumed to be the proxy variable to measure 
political influence of owners of natural resources, is calculated as a composite variable of 
oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, forest rents, and mineral rents. For all five 
components, rents are the difference between the value of production of the natural 
resource at world prices and the total cost of its production. The minerals included in the 
calculation of mineral rents are tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite 
and phosphate. Another possible proxy variable that may be used for the political 
influence of natural resource owners is the fuel-ore-metals exports, calculated as a 
summation of fuel, ores and metals exports. Although the estimation results of these two 
composite proxy variables are similar, total natural resource rents (resource rent in the 
estimations) is a better proxy variable than fuel-ore-metals exports especially in terms of 
identifying the three sectors; natural resource, manufacturing and agriculture separately 
from each other, for the coverage of fuel-ore-metals exports includes some manufactured 
natural resource products used in metallurgy and cermet industries.  
Manufacture exports are used to proxy the political influence that the 
manufacturers possess. Another possible macroeconomic indicator for this purpose is 
manufacturing value added. Manufacture exports broadly cover chemicals, machinery 
and transport equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured goods, while manufacturing 
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value added includes manufactures of agricultural products. Hence, manufacture exports 
provide a better representation of the manufacturing sector than manufacturing value 
added. Agriculture value added, the assumed proxy variable to measure the political 
influence that the landowners possess, includes the value added amounts of hunting, 
fishing, cultivation of crops, and livestock production. Another possible indicator that 
could have potentially been used as a proxy would have been agricultural raw materials 
exports, but this variable only includes crude materials, so its coverage is not as good as 
the coverage of agriculture value added in terms of representing the agriculture sector 
production in an accurate way.  
There are three governance quality indicators, political stability and absence of 
violence (polstab in the estimation tables), regulatory quality (regquality in the estimation 
tables), and rule of law (ruleoflaw in the estimation tables), used in regressions as control 
variables by themselves and as a component of interaction terms with the proxy variables. 
Political stability and absence of violence measures the probability that the government 
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. Regulatory 
quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
policies and regulations which favor private sector development. Rule of law covers 
issues such as the nature of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, and also the likelihood of crime and violence (Kaufmann et al., 2010). In the 
regressions, the political influence of the social classes is allowed to affect public 
education spending both directly and through the channel of governance indicators. In the 
literature, the rule of law is often used to capture institutional quality (Brunnschweiler, 
2008 and Bulte et al., 2005). The main purpose there is to explore the effect of natural 
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resource abundance on development and economic growth in countries with differing 
institutional quality levels. The three governance indicators identify different dimensions 
of the governance rules and institutions through which the authority and policies are 
exercised in a country. Therefore, the political influence of each of the three social 
classes may interact with each of the governance indicators, and so affects public 
education spending in a different way. Thus, for the purposes of this paper it is useful to 
employ different governance indicators in the regressions.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The primary data sources are the World 
Development Indicators (WDI), Global Development Finance (GDF), and Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) from the World Bank. Public education spending (as a 
share of GDP) is the dependent variable for the subsequent estimations throughout the 
paper. The proxy variables, total natural resources rents, manufacture exports, and 
agriculture value added, indicate the economic contribution of the natural resource 
owners, manufacturers and landowners, and are assumed to represent the political 
influence the natural resource owners, manufacturers and landowners possess 
respectively within a country. Therefore the main assumption here is that as a social 
group’s economic contribution to the aggregate output increases, its political influence in 
the society also increases.  
The data for the governance indicators are collected from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. The numerical values of the indicators change between -3.5 and 
+3.5 during the period 1996-2009. If the value of an indicator increases this refers to an 
improvement in that governance quality category. The log value of GDP per capita 
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(lngdpcapita in the estimation tables), school-age population share in total population, old 
population (age 65 and over) share in total population (Busemeyer, 2007, Fernandez and 
Rogerson, 1997, and Poterba, 1997), GDP per capita growth rate (gdpgrowth in the 
estimation tables) (Busemeyer, 2007), and openness degree are other explanatory 
variables that are found to be correlated with public education spending in the related 
literature. School-age population share is the population of the age-group theoretically 
corresponding to a given level of education as indicated by theoretical entrance age and 
duration divided by total population.  
 
III. ESTIMATION RESULTS  
Our aim here is to estimate the effect of the political influence of different social 
classes on public education spending working through the political institutions. To 
eliminate the possible omitted variable bias country and year-fixed effects are controlled 
in a panel data estimation covering the period 1996-2009 for 132 countries. For all 
regressions, the results of an F test indicate that there are significant country level effects, 
so the fixed effects panel data estimation is a more appropriate model specification than 
the pooled OLS. The benchmark estimation is written in equation (1) as the following,  
  ݌ݑܾ݈݅ܿ	݁݀ݑܿܽݐ݅݋݊	ݏ݌݁݊݀݅݊ ௜݃௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵݎ݁ݏ݋ݑݎܿ݁	ݎ݁݊ݐ௜௧ + ߚଶ݉ܽ݊ݑ݂ܽܿݐݑݎ݁௜௧ +
ߚଷܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݁௜௧ + ߚସሺݎ݁ݏ݋ݑݎܿ݁	ݎ݁݊ݐ ∗ ݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁	݅݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎሻ௜௧ +
ߚହሺ݉ܽ݊ݑ݂ܽܿݐݑݎ݁ ∗ ݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁	݅݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎሻ௜௧ +
ߚ଺ሺܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݁ ∗ ݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁	݅݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎሻ௜௧ + ߚ଻݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁	݅݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎ௜௧ + ߚᇱ଼ܼ௜௧ᇱ +
ߪ௜ + ߤ௧ + ߝ௜௧                                                                                           
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where public education spending is the dependent variable, σ represents country fixed 
effects, μ captures time fixed effects, and ߝ௜௧ is the error term. The proxy variables, total 
natural resources rents (resource rent), manufacture exports (manufacture), and 
agriculture value-added (agriculture), are used to measure the political influence of the 
natural resource owners, manufacturers, and landowners, respectively. Governance 
indicator refers to one of the three institutional quality indicators discussed in the 
previous section. The interaction terms of the proxy variables and the governance 
indicator demonstrate how the proxy variables interact with each of the three governance 
indicators.  
In the equation (1), ܼ is a vector of explanatory variables which includes the log 
value of GDP per capita, school-age population share in total population, old population 
share in total population, GDP per capita growth rate, and openness degree. The use of 
these variables is standard in the literature on the political economy of institutions and 
public education spending.  
All the estimations in Table 2 and Table 3 report the point estimates and standard 
errors in parentheses. The advantage of reporting point estimates is that they show the 
effects of marginal changes in the explanatory variables on public education spending. In 
all regressions the coefficients of log GDP per capita and GDP growth rate are negative 
and significant. This finding may be the result of the case that when countries become 
richer private education options may be more widespread and preferred compared to 
public education. Table 2 reports the estimation results for the comprehensive sample. 
Column (1) shows the result of the estimation without any interaction term.  
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In all estimations in Table 2 resource rent shows a direct negative and statistically 
significant effect on public education spending. Controlling for the political influence of 
the manufacturers and landowners through manufacture export and agriculture value 
added, respectively, the total impact of resource rent on public education spending is 
measured by its direct effect as well as through its indirect effects through political 
institutions proxied here by governance indicators. The interactions of resource rents with 
political stability and absence of violence (resourcepolstab in Column (2)), with 
regulatory quality (resourceregquality in Column (3)), and with rule of law (resourcerule 
in Column (4)) are statistically significant. The total effect of a marginal increase in 
resource rent implied by equation (1) is  
డ	௣௨௕௘ௗ௨
డ	௥௘௦௢௨௥௖௘	௥௘௡௧ = ߚመଵ + ߚመସ݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁	݅݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎ  
Hence when interacted with the variable “political stability and absence of violence” the 
effect of the political power of the natural resource owners on public education spending 
can be computed as  
−0.0384 + ሺ−0.0102 ∗ 0.0342752ሻ ≅ −0.039  
where 0.0342752 is the sample mean of political stability and absence of violence. In 
Column (4), through the channel of rule of law the total impact of resource rent on public 
education spending can be computed as,  
−0.0411 + ሺ−0.02 ∗ 0.0872166ሻ ≅ −0.043  
where 0.0872166 is the sample mean of rule of law.   
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Political stability and absence of violence measures the possibility that a 
government is destabilized or even completely changed by unconstitutional and illegal 
terrorist activities. Rule of law identifies the characteristics of contract enforcement, 
property rights, actions of the police and courts. On the basis of the numerical results 
obtained above, on average resource rent exerts a negative effect on public education 
spending. As the levels of political stability and absence of violence, and rule of law 
improve this negative effect intensifies. Since resource rent is used as a proxy for the 
political influence of the natural resource owners, when total resource rent, and thus, the 
political influence of natural resource owners increases within a country with high 
degrees of political stability and absence of violence as well as the rule of law, such as in 
northern European countries, politically powerful natural resource owners may prefer to 
engage in rent-seeking activities instead of investing in public education for human 
capital accumulation, design contract enforcement and actions of the police and courts 
according to their interests because there are no high level unconstitutional, terrorist 
activities which can reduce the political power of natural resource owners substantially. 
On the other hand, within a country where political stability is weak and there is a high 
risk of violent activities, when natural resource owners’ political influence increases, if 
they face a certain threat from opposing groups especially with a demand for a more 
educated labor force, natural resource owners, facing the possibility of losing their 
political power, may invest more in public education.  
Manufacture export, proxy variable for the political influence of the 
manufacturers, exerts a direct positive and significant effect (except Column (2)) on 
public education spending. Since skilled workers are needed in the industrial sectors, 
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when the manufacturers have more political influence they prefer to invest more in 
human capital accumulation. Although the coefficients of interaction terms of 
manufacture export and governance indicators are positive they appear insignificant.           
The political influence of landowners, proxied by agriculture value added, exerts 
a direct negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level effect on public 
education spending. This result of the landowners’ negative political influence on public 
education spending is consistent with the argument that since agricultural production 
does not require any skilled labor and educated workers migrate from agriculture sector 
to industrial sectors, when the landowners become politically more powerful this 
negatively affects public education spending levels within countries. The coefficients of 
the interaction terms of agriculture value added with regulatory quality (agriregquality) 
and rule of law (agrirule) appear statistically significant at 5 percent level and positive. 
The finding of significant and positive coefficients of the interaction terms suggests that 
the negative effect of the political influence of landowners on public education spending 
diminishes as the levels of regulatory quality and rule of law improve within a country. 
Nevertheless, the magnitudes of the interaction terms are not big enough to completely 
eliminate the negative direct effect of landowners’ political influence on public education 
spending, even for countries having higher levels of the above mentioned governance 
indicators.       
In order to determine the strength of the proxy variables estimated in previous 
regressions the baseline fixed effects regression is performed again with a sub-sample 
consisting of 69 middle-income countries defined as the countries which have gross 
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national income (GNI) per capita between $1,026 and $12,475 by the World Bank. The 
results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of the log value of GDP per capita and 
old population share are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The negative 
coefficient of GDP per capita indicates that as countries get richer; this negatively affects 
public education spending because private education options may be more preferred. The 
positive coefficient of old population share suggests that within middle income countries 
as the population gets older, in order to replace the lost workforce public education 
spending will increase.  
In all estimations, the proxy variables, resource rent, manufacture export, and 
agriculture value added preserve their previously found effects on public education 
spending at the statistically significant 5 percent level. Natural resource owners’ political 
influence exerts a negative effect on public education spending. However, the 
coefficients of interaction terms of resource rent and governance indicators are no longer 
statistically significant. Political stability and absence of violence, and rule of law appear 
to be important channels to determine the total effect of manufacture export on public 
education spending. As the levels of political stability and absence of violence, and rule 
of law improve the positive effect of manufacturers’ political influence on public 
education spending becomes stronger. Compared to the estimation results obtained using 
the comprehensive sample, now with the sample of middle income countries the 
magnitude of the positive effect of a marginal increase in manufacture export on public 
education spending is greater. Consistent with the previously found results, the 
improvements in regulatory quality and rule of law diminish the negative effect of 
landowners’ political influence on public education spending.       
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Furthermore two governance indicators and their interactions with resource rent, 
manufacture export, and agriculture value added are simultaneously included into the 
unbalanced panel data regressions (the comprehensive sample is used for the estimations) 
in order to investigate the validity of initial results. Resource rent and agriculture value 
added retain their direct negative and statistically significant effect on public education 
spending. There is a slight loss of significance in the manufacture export’s positive 
impact on public education spending. Regarding the effects of governance indicators 
working through the interaction terms, an increase in the degree of rule of law intensifies 
the negative effect of natural resource owners’ political influence on public education 
spending. Improvements in political stability and absence of violence, as in estimation 
results with middle income countries sample, reinforces the positive impact of 
manufacturers’ political power. An increase in the level of regulatory quality diminishes 
the negative effect of landowners’ political influence.         
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This paper presents empirical results about the effect of economic power and 
political influence of different social classes on public education spending in panel data 
estimation. Macroeconomic indicators are used as proxy variables to define the political 
influence of the social classes. The governance indicators, political stability and absence 
of violence, regulatory quality, and rule of law, are used to explore how the political 
influence of social classes interacts with the different aspects of institutions, and how 
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these interactions affect the overall relationship between the social groups’ political 
influence and public education spending.  
Resource rent is assumed as the proxy variable to represent the political influence 
of the natural resource owners. It shows a direct negative effect on public education 
spending. The interaction terms of resource rent with political stability-absence of 
violence and rule of law also contribute significantly to the overall impact of the political 
influence of natural resource owners. At low levels of political stability-absence of 
violence and rule of law, when the political power of natural resource owners increases, 
in the presence of strong opposition and unconstitutional activities, being afraid of losing 
their political influence and being overthrown, natural resource owners invest more in 
public education. On the other hand, at high levels of political stability- absence of 
violence and rule of law when the political influence of natural resource owners increases 
through rising resource rents, since they do not face a significant degree of strong 
opposition and terrorist activities, natural resource owners may engage into rent-seeking 
and kleptocracy activities, and invest less in public education.  
In most regressions manufacture export, the proxy variable assumed to define the 
political influence of the manufacturers, exerts a direct positive and statistically 
significant effect on public education spending. Therefore as the political influence of 
manufacturers increases this positively affects public education spending level. 
Considering estimations done with the middle income countries sample, the statistically 
significant and positive coefficients of the interaction terms of manufacture export with 
political stability-absence of violence and rule of law indicate that improvements in these 
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governance indicators reinforce the positive influence the manufacturers possess within a 
country.    
Agriculture value added is assumed to be the proxy for the economic power and 
political influence of the landowners. It shows a direct negative effect on public 
education spending indicating that when the political influence of landowners increases 
this negatively affects the level of public education spending. Through the interaction 
terms, increases in the levels of regulatory quality and rule of law diminish this direct 
negative effect.  
In the cases of controlling multiple interaction terms simultaneously and repeating 
the benchmark regressions with a different sample resource rent, manufacture export, and 
agriculture value added preserve the nature and significance of their effects on public 
education spending in most of the estimations. Using resource rents, manufacture exports, 
and agriculture value added as proxy variables to define the political influences of the 
social classes may be a strong assumption, but there is no study in political science 
literature presenting good data which identify political party platforms according to the 
social classes supporting these parties and economic policy agendas.  
Regarding how this paper is related to the resource abundance, institutional 
quality and economic growth literature, Mehlum et al. (2006) argue that resource 
abundance is beneficial for economic growth when the institutions are producer friendly 
and harmful for economic growth when the institutions are grabber friendly. They use the 
share of primary exports in GNP in 1970 from Sachs and Warner (1995) as resource 
abundance indicator and a composite index for institutional quality. Boschini et al. (2007) 
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draw attention to the interactions between institutional quality and different types of 
resources, and their varying effects on economic growth. Brunnschweiler (2008) uses 
subsoil wealth per capita as resource abundance indicator, and rule of law and 
government effectiveness from the Worldwide Governance Indicators to define 
institutional quality. She finds that resource abundance has a direct positive effect on 
economic growth although the negative coefficients of the interaction terms suggest that 
this positive effect diminishes as the quality of institutions improves. In all these studies, 
the dependent variable is an economic growth indicator. Aslaksen (2007) uses panel data 
specification controlling for country and time fixed effects to estimate the impact of 
resource abundance on corruption.  
The present paper provides a contribution to the natural resources and economic 
growth  literature in the sense that when the economic power and political influence of 
the natural resource owners, proxied by the resource rents, increase this negatively affects 
public education spending levels. Resource rent is a composite variable including oil 
rents, natural gas rents, forest rents, coal rents, and minerals rents. Hence, these five types 
of natural resource rents altogether are assumed to define the economic market power and 
relative political influence of natural resource owners.  
In order to explore different aspects of the interaction between institutional 
quality and political influences of the social classes, three governance indicators are used 
in the regressions. The estimation results examining the effects of proxy variables show 
that through the interaction terms the governance indicators play significant roles in 
determining the total impacts of natural resource owners’, manufacturers’, and 
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landowners’ political influence on public education spending, referring to the argument 
that the quality of political institutions is an important factor in determining economic 
development which is discussed in detail in economic growth and political economy 
literature.  
Future research prospects include single country case studies to find out how country-
specific political party platforms and social class structure affect economic development; 
country-group studies to explore how similar geographical, regional or economic 
conditions, potential political conflicts between countries affect economic growth. Also, 
the integration of political coalition structure into the empirical framework would be 
useful. 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics           
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
public education overall 0.0465773 0.0178768 2.20E-08 0.1605884 N =    1142 
between 0.0166878 0.0107698 0.1345486 n =     132 
within 0.0065282 0.0116075 0.080467 T = 8.65152 
              
resource rent overall 0.069023 0.1206953 0 0.7124102 N =    1847 
between 0.1134383 0 0.4881426 n =     132 
within 0.0422454 -0.1934626 0.3296232 T = 13.9924 
              
manufacture overall 0.150221 0.1799946 1.66E-06 1.545786 N =    1651 
between 0.176313 0.0002292 1.250382 n =     132 
within 0.0420577 -0.1074521 0.4456247 T = 12.5076 
              
agriculture overall 0.1427335 0.1309526 0 0.6196861 N =    1783 
between 0.1296638 0 0.5412981 n =     132 
within 0.0285795 -0.0018374 0.2912675 T = 13.5076 
              
lngdpcapita overall 8.687819 1.288765 5.846806 11.16942 N =    1846 
between 1.285605 5.876393 11.06253 n =     132 
within 0.1489319 8.032617 9.563109 T = 13.9848 
              
schoolage overall 0.5152618 0.1283044 0.0877251 0.7828103 N =    1838 
between 0.1244458 0.2857989 0.7320508 n =     132 
within 0.0328315 0.1558916 0.8809171 T = 13.9242 
              
oldpopulation overall 0.0764213 0.0502971 0.0044591 0.2204764 N =    1848 
between 0.0501886 0.0086851 0.1883664 n =     132 
within 0.0053506 0.0407663 0.1118534 T =      14 
              
gdpgrowth overall 0.025331 0.0421752 -0.1754528 0.3303049 N =    1846 
between 0.0207922 -0.0273782 0.1188897 n =     132 
within 0.0367301 -0.2070456 0.2367462 T = 13.9848 
              
openness overall 0.8476624 0.4384633 0.1493284 4.146187 N =    1813 
between 0.4242345 0.2315079 3.264811 n =     132 
within 0.1230053 0.0676905 1.729038 T = 13.7348 
              
political stability overall 0.0342752 0.8924227 -2.756399 1.576872 N =    1447 
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between 0.8445778 -1.923149 1.412548 n =     132 
within 0.2942668 -1.273218 1.608206 T = 10.9621 
              
regulatory quality overall 0.1751986 0.8746884 -2.272891 3.345251 N =    1442 
between 0.8439908 -1.630469 1.816379 n =     132 
within 0.2450257 -1.150496 2.31369 T = 10.9242 
              
ruleoflaw overall 0.0872166 0.9292883 -1.741681 1.964045 N =    1445 
between 0.9109179 -1.384658 1.889363 n =     132 
within 0.1924041 -1.404147 1.474483 T =  10.947 
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Table 6. Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
resourcerent -0.0316** -0.0384** -0.0354** -0.0411** 
 (0.00607) (0.00731) (0.00686) (0.00714) 
     
manufacture 0.0106* 0.0107 0.0140* 0.0127* 
 (0.00612) (0.00730) (0.00737) (0.00699) 
     
agriculture -0.111** -0.0989** -0.0884** -0.0855** 
 (0.0114) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0145) 
     
lngdpcapita -0.0104** -0.00833** -0.00880** -0.00909** 
 (0.00267) (0.00308) (0.00306) (0.00300) 
     
schoolage 0.0103 0.0123 0.0119 0.0132 
 (0.00916) (0.00978) (0.00973) (0.00975) 
     
oldpopulation 0.0571 0.0377 0.0476 0.0294 
 (0.0573) (0.0640) (0.0637) (0.0635) 
     
gdpgrowth -0.0147** -0.0169** -0.0193** -0.0194** 
 (0.00660) (0.00739) (0.00735) (0.00735) 
     
openness -0.00355 -0.00622** -0.00502* -0.00569* 
 (0.00256) (0.00293) (0.00290) (0.00293) 
     
polstab  -0.00189   
  (0.00166)   
     
resourcepolstab  -0.0102*   
  (0.00581)   
     
manufacturepolstab  0.00713   
  (0.00447)   
     
agripolstab  0.00667   
  (0.00574)   
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regquality   -0.00400**  
   (0.00183)  
     
resourceregquality   -0.0117*  
   (0.00706)  
     
manufactureregquality   -0.00118  
   (0.00470)  
     
agriregquality   0.0319**  
   (0.00972)  
     
ruleoflaw    -0.00481** 
    (0.00214) 
     
resourcerule    -0.0200** 
    (0.00729) 
     
manufacturerule    0.00253 
    (0.00460) 
     
agrirule    0.0265** 
    (0.00936) 
Observations 1016 828 830 830 
R2 0.157 0.165 0.173 0.177 
Note: Public education spending is the dependent variable. Fixed effects model is used in all estimations. Point estimates are reported.  Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. All regressions include a constant term and year fixed effects (not reported).  
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Table 7. Regression Results: Middle Income Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
resourcerent -0.0220** -0.0295** -0.0325** -0.0395** 
 (0.00905) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0128) 
     
manufacture 0.0248** 0.0257** 0.0303** 0.0397** 
 (0.0102) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0120) 
     
agriculture -0.111** -0.0878** -0.0950** -0.0770** 
 (0.0172) (0.0205) (0.0211) (0.0233) 
     
lngdpcapita -0.0167** -0.0126** -0.0136** -0.0145** 
 (0.00411) (0.00490) (0.00490) (0.00465) 
     
schoolage 0.0105 0.0118 0.0159 0.0187 
 (0.0128) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0136) 
     
oldpopulation 0.472** 0.410** 0.323** 0.332** 
 (0.121) (0.144) (0.141) (0.142) 
     
gdpgrowth -0.0198** -0.0229** -0.0256** -0.0244** 
 (0.00999) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
     
openness -0.00909** -0.00957** -0.00938** -0.0114** 
 (0.00405) (0.00470) (0.00470) (0.00470) 
     
polstab  -0.00727**   
  (0.00291)   
     
resourcepolstab  -0.00358   
  (0.00862)   
     
manufacturepolstab  0.0317**   
  (0.00783)   
     
agripolstab  0.0231   
  (0.0147)   
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regquality   -0.0109**  
   (0.00332)  
     
resourceregquality   -0.00915  
   (0.0108)  
     
manufactureregquality   0.0111  
   (0.0116)  
     
agriregquality   0.0667**  
   (0.0228)  
     
ruleoflaw    -0.0156** 
    (0.00391) 
     
resourcerule    -0.0121 
    (0.0123) 
     
manufacturerule    0.0368** 
    (0.0117) 
     
agrirule    0.0719** 
    (0.0242) 
Observations 528 436 438 438 
R2 0.175 0.202 0.191 0.213 
Note: Public education spending is the dependent variable. Fixed effects model is used in all estimations. Point estimates are reported.  Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. All regressions include a constant term and year fixed effects (not reported). 
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CHAPTER III 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The effect of institutions on economic performance has remained a long-debated and 
unresolved issue in the literature. The examples of institutional reform failures in Africa, 
Latin America, the former Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s, and the recent cases of 
Afghanistan and Iraq support the view that radical changes in institutions do not 
necessarily have a positive effect on economic outcomes (Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson, 
and Robinson, 2011). According to Hayek (1960), institutions cannot be designed and 
have to emerge and form under natural and local conditions. A related view states that the 
externally-imposed institutions and reforms should be in harmony with the set of 
circumstances in the host countries (Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, 2003a, b, Rodrik, 
2007). Nevertheless, there are successful external institutional reform cases such as the 
post Second World War institutional transformations in Germany and Japan designed by 
the United States.  
The related debate about the economic outcomes of the French Revolution has also not 
reached an agreement. On the one hand, some economic historians identify the French 
Revolution and following wars as an obstacle slowing down technology adoption and the 
industrial revolution in Continental Europe (Landes, 1969 and Crouzet, 2001). 
Specifically for the Dutch economy, Buyst and Mokyr (1990) argue that the Napoleonic 
wars hampered economic development in the Netherlands. On the other hand, the view 
that the enactment of the civil code, abolition of guilds and serfdom, and agricultural 
reforms caused by the French Revolution led the way to the industrial revolution and 
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institutional enlightenment in Continental Europe suggests that French Revolution 
fostered economic development in parts of Europe affected by the Revolution and 
subsequent invasion (Olson, 1982 and Acemoglu, 2008).      
In Chapter Three I investigate the impact of externally-imposed institutions on 
differences in regional economic growth within a country. Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson, 
and Robinson (2011) recently attempted to explore the impact of the French Revolution 
on German institutions and long-run German economic growth. To do this they compared 
the differences in the economic performance of those German states that were invaded by 
Napoleonic armies and that adopted French institutions with other German states that 
retained the particularly German legal and economic institutions throughout. They show 
that there remained a sustained difference in economic performance long after the 
invaders retreated. What remains to be shown is whether or not the differences are 
spurious.  
I test this by comparing differences in the long-run economic performance of French 
regions. Since the French Revolution reforms and institutions were uniformly enforced 
across all regions in France, if, as hypothesized, it is found that there are significant 
regional growth differences in France, it would count as evidence against the hypothesis 
that all the regional economic development differences between invaded and non-invaded 
German polities were due to the French institutions. Adopting a strategy similar to the 
one employed for Germany by Acemoglu et al. (2011), I use the urbanization rates of the 
95 departments in France as a proxy for economic development. The data for city and 
department size are collected from statistics compiled by Chandler (1987) and Lahmeyer 
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(n.d.). Urbanization rates are computed for the years 1810 and 1901. By using a simple 
statistical t-test, I show that significantly different urbanization rates were observed in the 
French departments as well in both periods. This finding of different urbanization rates 
among the French regions suggests that the departments went through different economic 
development experiences during the Napoleonic period (1810) and in the post-
Napoleonic period (1901). Furthermore, a difference-in-differences estimation is done to 
examine whether or not there is a treatment effect causing the regional growth differences 
in France. If uniform or similar urbanization rates across French departments had been 
experienced this could have suggested that French Revolution reforms and institutions 
were effective in causing similar growth rates across regions. The result of regional 
economic prosperity differences across French departments in the periods after the launch 
of the French Revolution indicates that all the variation in economic growth between the 
French-invaded and non-invaded German polities cannot be attributed to the French 
Revolution reforms and institutions.                 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the 
history and fundamental reasons of the French Revolution. Section 3 provides a summary 
of the Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson, and Robinson (2011) paper and empirical evidence 
from Germany. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis, and section 5 concludes.  
 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 
The French Revolution took place under negative economic conditions. The monarchical 
authority was in bankruptcy. Agricultural production in northern France was damaged by 
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poor weather conditions, causing the price of bread, the main staple food for most of the 
population, to rise. Since consumers spent the majority of their earnings on food the 
demand for other goods decreased (Doyle, 2001). Moreover, the manufacturing sector 
was negatively affected by British competition and the ensuing lower prices under the 
commercial treaty of 1786. In addition to this, the unemployment rate in France was 
increasing, and an unexpectedly cold winter hampered production by mills and bulk 
transport. 
Before the French Revolution social life and the economy were controlled by a few 
dominant groups. The landlords imposed a form of serfdom by putting peasants under the 
burden of heavy taxes and tributes, limiting the mobility of peasants, and hindering the 
emergence of a free labor market. The urban oligarchy dominant in trade and production 
sectors strictly controlled important occupations for their own economic benefit by 
restricting new entry into professions and use of new technology (Doyle, 2001). In rural 
areas, the nobility and Church clergy had the privilege of not paying taxes, and they were 
not subject to the same laws and courts as peasants, which created an inequitable political 
and economic atmosphere. 
The long-term and widespread economic crisis and social inequality led in 1789 to a 
meeting of the Estates-General for the first time in 175 years. The Estates-General took 
the name National Constituent Assembly with the promise of gathering more political 
power in itself and writing a constitution. It abolished feudalism, the nobility’s special 
privileges and rights, and the Church clergy’s authority of taxation. The constitution that 
was finalized on September 29, 1791 declared France as a constitutional monarchy. The 
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abolition of guilds followed. In 1804 Napoleon declared himself as emperor, and between 
1799 and 1815 he pursued a widespread invasion in Continental Europe.     
The French Revolution was triggered by social injustice and economic crisis, and it 
caused removal of the institutions of the ancien regime, and had profound political and 
economic consequences. The abolition of serfdom and guilds, and agricultural reforms 
initiated the emergence of mobile and free labor markets and manufacturing activities. 
The enactment of French civil code, which established the principle of equality before the 
law, and the establishment of commercial courts paved the way to a legal environment 
and a system favoring new businesses, entrepreneurial activities and industrialization.                         
      
III. ACEMOGLU, CANTONI, JOHNSON, AND ROBINSON (2011) PAPER  
Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson, and Robinson (2011) use evidence on differences in 
German regional growth to test the hypothesis that radical and externally-imposed 
reforms of the French Revolution caused higher and more rapid economic growth in the 
German polities where they were imposed. Acemoglu et al. (2011) investigate the 
relationship between the length of French Revolutionary armies’ occupation (treatment 
variable) and economic prosperity in a reduced-form analysis. Further, in a two-stage 
least squares framework they analyze impact of the timing and enforcement length of 
main French Revolution reforms such as the enactment of French civil code, agricultural 
reforms and abolition of guilds on institutional transformation and long-run economic 
development across German polities. They adopt urbanization rates as the proxy measure 
for economic prosperity, and thus as their dependent variable in the benchmark 
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estimations. The treatment variable that Acemoglu et al. (2011) use is defined as the 
number of years between 1792 and 1815 that the polity in question was under invasion of 
Napoleonic armies.  
Acemoglu et al. (2011) use OLS estimation to examine the relationship between French 
treatment and urbanization rates across German polities. The time periods they use in the 
data panel are 1700, 1750, 1800, 1850, 1875, and 1900. They provide evidence through 
OLS estimation and joint significance tests of post-treatment years, that in those German 
states invaded by Napoleonic armies and where French Revolution institutional reforms 
were enforced a faster urbanization took place after 1850. They argue that French 
invasion and Revolution reforms in occupied states were effective in the launch of 
Continental Europe’s industrial revolution in the second half of the 19th century. For 
robustness check, they control for interactions between time dummy variables and 
various time-invariant variables such as religion, longitude, and distance to Paris. These 
controls do not change the results of the OLS estimation too much.   
In the second part of their analysis, Acemoglu et al. (2011) use a two-stage least squares 
method to estimate the impact of French occupation on urbanization rates through the 
timing and length of enforcement of Revolution reforms. For the first stage, they 
construct a reform index by adding the number of years each of the 4 important 
Revolution reforms (Code Napoleon, abolition of serfdom, agrarian reforms, and 
abolition of guilds) had been implemented in a polity and dividing by 4. They examine 
the relationship between the time period of French presence and the reform index. Then, 
in the second stage they estimate the effect of the reform index on urbanization rate. As 
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in the reduced-form estimation, they conclude that the institutional reforms caused a 
more rapid economic growth especially after 1850.     
Acemoglu et al. (2011), as a result of their two-fold empirical analysis, argue that the 
French occupation in German polities launched radical and externally-imposed 
institutional reforms such as imposition of the civil code, agricultural reforms, 
commercial courts, and abolition of guilds which caused the emergence of a state 
structure supporting an industrializing society, a relatively free labor market, commercial 
and manufacturing businesses. Hence the French invasion, and externally-imposed 
Revolution reforms and institutions gave way to more rapid long-run economic 
development in occupied German polities, and to regional economic growth differences 
within Germany.   
Nevertheless, Acemoglu et al. (2011) mention some caveats about their findings. They 
acknowledge that higher economic growth was observed in German polities where 
French Revolution institutions were imposed mainly after 1850. Moreover, they 
recognize that there is limited historical data available, and they argue the results found 
regarding a limited time period may not be generalized for other time periods.     
 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
 Data Details and Empirical Strategy  
To reexamine the issue, I propose to look at the growth experience of French 
‘departments’ in the same period. The ‘departments’ in France are considered as the 
appropriate geographical units to identify long-run regional growth differences in the 
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empirical analysis. The administrative area of France is divided into 95 departments. The 
proxy for economic development is the urbanization rate, which is commonly defined in 
the literature as the fraction of the population living in cities with more than 5000 
inhabitants (Chandler, 1987, and Bairoch, Batou and Chevre, 1988). Urbanization rates 
across French regions are calculated from city and department population statistics from 
Chandler (1987) and Lahmeyer’s population database (n.d.).  
One of the main points of interest of the present paper is to develop a critical examination 
of the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2011) where the period of analysis is 1700-1900. 
Moreover, because of data availability urbanization rates at the department level are 
computed for the years 1810 and 1901 on the basis of population statistics of 697 cities. 
The departments are divided into 16 border and 79 interior departments. Paris and its 
surrounding area, and Northeast-East regions close to Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Germany, and Switzerland are defined as border departments. The division 
of French departments into two sets is motivated by the finding in the economic history 
literature that the industrial revolution in continental Europe was initially a regional 
development that was determined by the availability of coal and other minerals that 
served as inputs in the fledgling industrial sector (Barnes et al., 1966, Cameron and Neal, 
2003, Clapham, 1936, and Pollard, 1981). The regions where these inputs were readily 
available formed a corridor that ran from parts of Belgium through northeastern France, 
down to the border of France with Switzerland. Much of Germany occupied by 
Napoleonic armies also happens to be part of this mineral-rich region in northern Europe, 
suggesting a probable mechanism for differential growth within Germany independent of 
the institutional framework imposed.  
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In the following two subsections statistical tools and difference-in-differences estimation 
are used to demonstrate the variation in economic development among departments in 
France. In the Appendix, Table1 shows the department names, capital city of each 
department, whether it is classified as an interior or border department, and urbanization 
rates for 1810 and 1901.      
 
Classical Hypothesis Testing 
In this section a simple t-test is conducted to test the null hypothesis that the mean 
urbanization rates of border and interior departments are equal to each in the years 1810 
and 1901. In the year 1810 urbanization data are available for 87 departments because of 
missing population statistics. Table 2 and Table 3 in the Appendix show descriptive 
statistics of urbanization in 1810 and 1901 grouped by border and interior departments. It 
is found out that in the 95 percent confidence interval we can reject the null hypothesis 
for year 1810 at 88.21 percent level, and for year 1901 at 99.58 percent. Hence, statistical 
test results show that different urbanization rates were experienced across departments, 
suggesting that French departments went through different economic growth experiences 
in the short and the long-run after the French Revolution. The result of different 
urbanization rates indicates that within France significant regional economic growth 
differences occurred after the Revolution and imposition of institutional reforms.  
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Difference-in-differences Estimation    
In their paper Acemoglu et al. (2011) argue that some German polities grew faster than 
others because these polities were subjected to the treatment of French Revolution 
reforms and institutions through French invasion while others did not. One way to test 
this argument is to carry out a difference-in-differences regression for the French case. As 
it is already shown in the previous section that there were differences in regional growth 
in France, let us apply the logic of the argument in Acemoglu et al. (2011) without the 
specification of the treatment in France and examine if we can find the existence of a 
treatment effect for economic growth differences in France. The benchmark regression is 
as follows:  
ݑ௜௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ݀௜௧ + ߚଶ݌௜௧ + ߚଷሺ݀௜௧ ∗ ݌௜௧ሻ + ߝ௜௧                                                                (1)                         
where ݑ௜௧ is the urbanization rate in department ݅ at time ݐ, ݀௜௧ is a region dummy 
variable taking up the value 1 if the department is a border department, ݌௜௧ is a time 
dummy variable, and it is equal to 1 if the period is year 1901, ሺ݀௜௧ ∗ ݌௜௧ሻ is an interaction 
term, and ߝ௜௧ is a disturbance term. The purpose of running a difference-in-differences 
regression is (taking into account the data limitations) to identify the existence of a 
treatment effect that caused the regional economic prosperity differences between the 
border departments and interior departments in France.       
Table 4 depicts the regression results. The coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant. The results suggest that there is evidence of some treatment effect across 
French departments as well, similar to the case of the treatment effect in German polities. 
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Since, in France, the French Revolution reforms and institutions were enforced uniformly 
across all regions, the treatment effect cannot possibly due to differences in institutions.  
This finding count as a counter-argument against the argument of Acemoglu et al. (2011) 
that it was the French Revolution institutions and reforms that caused higher economic 
growth in the German polities invaded by French armies compared to other polities 
which were not invaded. One possible explanation for the differences in regional growth 
observed both in Germany and France could be the mining of coal and other minerals, 
and its positive impact on subsequent industrialization in continental Europe as suggested 
by Barnes et al. (1966), Cameron and Neal (2003), and Pollard (1981).       
 
V. CONCLUSION  
The French Revolution resulted in a large-scale and long-term institutional 
transformation in Europe. It permanently changed the social and political setting in 
France, and then in Continental Europe through invasions of French Revolutionary 
armies and Napoleon. Whether externally-imposed institutions and specifically French 
Revolution reforms positively affected economic development is a long-debated topic. 
Acemoglu et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence that externally-imposed, radical 
French Revolution institutions caused a faster long-run economic growth in the invaded 
German polities compared to non-invaded polities especially after 1850. The present 
paper proposes a counter-argument to Acemoglu et al. (2011) saying that differences in 
institutions may not have been the only or leading reason in causing regional economic 
growth differences.  
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Urbanization rates at the French department level are used as proxy for economic 
development for the years 1810 and 1901. The 95 departments are divided into two 
subgroups as interior and border departments. By using a statistical t-test, we can 
comfortably reject the null hypothesis that average urbanization rates of interior and 
border departments were equal, indicating that regional economic growth differences 
were experienced within France. This result suggests that even though French Revolution 
institutions were imposed uniformly within France, they did not cause the departments to 
experience similar economic growth trends both in the short-run and long-run after the 
onset of French Revolution.  
Then, a difference-in-differences estimation is used to identify the existence of a 
treatment effect responsible for regional growth differences in France. The finding of a 
treatment effect provides a counter-argument to Acemoglu et al. (2011) where they argue 
that externally-imposed Revolution institutions and reforms caused a faster long-run 
economic development in occupied German polities compared to non-occupied German 
polities which retained particularly German institutions and law.           
If it had not been for the French Revolution institutions and reforms, then what could 
cause the higher economic growth rates in the border departments of France? The coal 
mining and proto-industrialization activities in Northeast-East France where border 
departments cluster might have fostered industrial development and economic prosperity 
in these regions (Barnes et al, 1966, Pollard, 1981, and Cameron and Neal, 2003). In fact, 
coal mining and proto-industrialization also played an important role in those German 
polities which were invaded by the French Revolutionary and then Napoleonic armies, 
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and where French Revolution institutional reforms were implemented. Unfortunately, we 
do not have access to historical coal and other mines data at the regional level11. If we 
had such an access we could have tested this argument empirically. It is certainly the case 
that the findings of this paper would be strengthened if more detailed, micro-level 
historical data related to coal mining, railway construction, and infant industrialization 
were made available.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11 Detailed historical European statistics at the country level can be found in Mitchell (1981). 
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Table 8. Urbanization in French Departments        
department dept.no capital 
urbanization 
1810 
urbanization 
1901  region 
Ain 1 Bourg-en-Bresse 2.36 7.29 interior 
Aisne 2 Laon 5.56 19.42 interior 
Allier 3 Moulins 10.64 21.21 interior 
Alpes-de-Haute-
Provence 4 Digne 3.88 12.87 interior 
Alpes (Hautes-) 5 Gap 6.91 10.05 interior 
Alpes-Maritimes 6 Nice NA 60.91 interior 
Ardèche 7 Privas 1.96 9.47 interior 
Ardennes 8 
Charleville-
Mézières 8.74 17.40 border 
Ariège 9 Foix 2.88 8.55 interior 
Aube 10 Troyes 11.78 25.22 interior 
Aude 11 Carcassonne 10.79 19.01 interior 
Aveyron 12 Rodez 3.56 12.12 interior 
Bouches-du-Rhône 13 Marseille 50.08 80.27 interior 
Calvados 14 Caen 13.89 19.82 interior 
Cantal 15 Aurillac 4.36 7.59 interior 
Charente 16 Angoulême 4.64 16.30 interior 
Charente-Maritime 17 La Rochelle 9.47 20.95 interior 
Cher 18 Bourges 10.54 19.33 interior 
Corrèze 19 Tulle 5.88 9.92 interior 
Corse 20 Ajaccio 10.40 15.97 interior 
Côte-d'Or 21 Dijon 8.50 23.53 interior 
Côtes-d'Armor 22 Saint-Brieuc 3.81 7.88 interior 
Creuse 23 Guéret 0 2.56 interior 
Dordogne 24 Périgueux 5.52 10.57 interior 
Doubs 25 Besançon 12.38 27.00 border 
Drôme 26 Valence 11.68 19.31 interior 
Eure 27 Évreux 5.49 11.14 interior 
Eure-et-Loir 28 Chartres 9.95 14.71 interior 
Finistère 29 Quimper 11.13 24.71 interior 
Gard 30 Nîmes 20.09 29.97 interior 
Garonne (Haute-) 31 Toulouse 14.23 33.40 interior 
Gers 32 Auch 3.04 5.83 interior 
Gironde 33 Bordeaux 21.42 41.91 interior 
Hérault 34 Montpellier 25.04 36.47 interior 
Ille-et-Vilaine 35 Rennes 13.03 21.28 interior 
Indre 36 Châteauroux 8.80 13.57 interior 
Indre-et-Loire 37 Tours 7.98 19.28 interior 
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Isère 38 Grenoble 8.47 20.74 interior 
Jura 39 Lons-le-Saunier 4.17 14.50 border 
Landes 40 Mont-de-Marsan 0 7.51 interior 
Loir-et-Cher 41 Blois 13.53 15.03 interior 
Loire 42 Saint-Étienne 16.33 39.31 interior 
Loire (Haute-) 43 Le Puy 4.85 6.56 interior 
Loire-Atlantique 44 Nantes 20.51 31.05 interior 
Loiret 45 Orléans 18.81 23.89 interior 
Lot 46 Cahors 4.36 6.18 interior 
Lot-et-Garonne 47 Agen 8.97 16.33 interior 
Lozère 48 Mende 3.83 5.66 interior 
Maine-et-Loire 49 Angers 10.99 22.93 interior 
Manche 50 Saint-Lô 3.93 16.22 interior 
Marne 51 Châlons-sur-Marne 16.60 37.93 border 
Marne (Haute-) 52 Chaumont 8.34 17.26 interior 
Mayenne 53 Laval 7.45 12.94 interior 
Meurthe-et-Moselle 54 Nancy 15.65 33.05 border 
Meuse 55 Bar-le-Duc 3.34 13.79 border 
Morbihan 56 Vannes 6.95 16.49 interior 
Moselle 57 Metz 11.65 23.88 border 
Nièvre 58 Nevers 7.94 11.21 interior 
Nord 59 Lille 29.32 48.75 border 
Oise 60 Beauvais 6.83 14.81 interior 
Orne 61 Alençon 6.47 11.41 interior 
Pas-de-Calais 62 Arras 13.47 30.24 border 
Puy-de-Dôme 63 Clermont-Ferrand 11.75 16.06 interior 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques 64 Pau 7.86 20.99 interior 
Pyrénées (Hautes-) 65 Tarbes 4.13 16.15 interior 
Pyrénées-Orientales 66 Perpignan 9.84 17.07 interior 
Rhin (Bas-) 67 Strasbourg 14.93 31.03 border 
Rhin (Haut-) 68 Colmar 6.92 30.67 border 
Rhône 69 Lyon 42.77 60.68 interior 
Saône (Haute-) 70 Vesoul 1.76 3.64 interior 
Saône-et-Loire 71 Mâcon 6.67 19.83 interior 
Sarthe 72 Le Mans 5.78 17.46 interior 
Savoie 73 Chambéry 2.22 14.29 interior 
Savoie (Haute-) 74 Annecy NA 7.54 interior 
Paris 75 Paris 98.33 100.00 border 
Seine-Maritime 76 Rouen 23.05 45.10 interior 
Seine-et-Marne 77 Melun 8.40 19.43 interior 
Yvelines 78 Versailles 7.84 39.33 interior 
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Sévres (Deux-) 79 Niort 5.75 8.47 interior 
Somme 80 Amiens 12.34 20.68 interior 
Tarn 81 Albi 10.40 22.55 interior 
Tarn-et-Garonne 82 Montauban 10.81 15.59 interior 
Var 83 Toulon 15.94 47.43 interior 
Vaucluse 84 Avignon 24.41 35.37 interior 
Vendée 85 La Roche-sur-Yon 4.71 9.47 interior 
Vienne 86 Poitiers 11.76 18.05 interior 
Vienne (Haute-) 87 Limoges 8.51 25.01 interior 
Vosges 88 Épinal 7.35 16.39 border 
Yonne 89 Auxerre 6.42 10.53 interior 
Belfort (Territoire de) 90 Belfort NA 35.32 interior 
Essonne 91 Évry NA 16.95 interior 
Hauts-de-Seine 92 Nanterre NA 90.18 border 
Seine-Saint-Denis 93 Bobigny NA 79.04 border 
Val-de-Marne 94 Créteil NA 81.41 border 
Val-d'Oise 95 Pontoise NA 18.79 interior 
Note: The missing urbanization rates for eight departments in 1810 are shown with ‘NA’. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Urbanization in 1810         
Department Obs. Mean Standard Error Standard Deviation 95%Conf. Interval 
Border 13 18.681 6.893 24.854 3.662 33.700 
Interior 74 10.013 0.962 8.275 8.01 11.93 
Combined 87 11.308 1.330 12.408 8.664 13.953 
Difference   8.668 6.960   -6.423 23.759 
Note: Descriptive statistics for urbanization in 1810 at the department level. 
 
Table 10. Urbanization in 1901         
Department Obs. Mean Standard Error Standard Deviation 95% Conf. Interval 
Border 16 42.204 7.218 28.874 26.818 57.589 
Interior 79 20.123 1.536 13.648 17.066 23.180 
Combined 95 23.842 1.938 18.884 19.995 27.689 
Difference   22.081 7.380   6.466 37.696 
Note: Descriptive statistics for urbanization in 1901 at the department level. 
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Table 11. Difference-in-Differences Estimation   
 (1) 
 urbanization 
݀௜௧ 0.0867* 
 (0.0448) 
  
݌௜௧ 0.101** 
 (0.0241) 
  
݀௜௧ ∗ ݌௜௧ 0.134** 
 (0.0606) 
  
constant 0.100** 
 (0.0173) 
Observations 182 
R2 0.268 
Note: Urbanization is the dependent variable. Standard  
         errors are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%;  
        ** significant at 5%. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I 
A.1. Socially Optimal Tax Rate 
 As follows from (1), (18), (20) and (21), in period ݐ + 1 the aggregate output, ܳ௧ାଵ, is 
written as the following,  
ܳ௧ାଵ = ܳሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ܰ, ܼሻ = ܳெሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ߜெሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ܰ, ܼሻ, ߜேሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ܰ, ܼሻ, ܰሻ +
																																																												ܳ஺ሺߜெሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ܰ, ܼሻ, ߜேሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ܰ, ܼሻ	, ܼሻ                      
       
ܳ௧ାଵ =
ሾሺ1 −
߬௧ሻܽܳ௧ሿఈ	ሾߜெሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ܰ, ܼሻ	݄ሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻሿఏ	ൣܰఉሾߜேሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ܰ, ܼሻ	݄ሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻሿଵିఉ൧ሺଵିఈିఏሻ +
ܼఊሺ1 − ߜேሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ܰ, ܼሻ − ߜெሺܳ௧, ߬௧, ܰ, ܼሻሻଵିఊ  
 
߲ܳ௧ାଵ ߲߬௧ =⁄ − ܽܳ௧ߙܳ௧ାଵெ ܭ௧ାଵିଵ + ܽܳ௧ߠܳ௧ାଵெ ሾ݄ሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵ݄ᇱሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻ + ܽܳ௧ሺ1 − ߚሻሺ1 −
ߙ − ߠሻܳ௧ାଵெ ሾ݄ሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵ݄ᇱሺ߬௧ܽܳ௧ሻ = 0                                                                                                      
߲ܳ௧ାଵ ߲߬௧ = ܽܳ௧⁄ ሾ−ܴሺܳ௧, ߬௧∗, ܰ, ܼሻ + ߜ௧ାଵெ∗ ݓ௧ାଵெ ݄ᇱሺ߬௧∗ܽܳ௧ሻ +
ߩ௧ାଵߜ௧ାଵே∗ ݓ௧ାଵே ݄ᇱሺ߬௧∗ܽܳ௧ሻሿ = 0                   
Then, it follows that  
ሾߜெ∗ሺܳ௧, ߬௧∗, ܰ, ܼሻ	ݓ௧ାଵெ ݄ᇱሺ߬௧∗ܽܳ௧ሻሿ + ሾߩ௧ାଵߜே∗ሺܳ௧, ߬௧∗, ܰ, ܼሻݓ௧ାଵே ݄ᇱሺ߬௧∗ܽܳ௧ሻሿ =
ܴሺܳ௧, ߬௧∗, ܰ, ܼሻ                                                                                                                               
Hence, ߬௧∗ equates the marginal returns to human capital employed in the natural 
resources sector and manufacturing sector to the marginal return to physical capital. This 
shows that ߬௧∗ is the socially optimal tax rate which both maximizes the aggregate output 
and achieves the efficient level of investment in public education.   
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A.2. Preferred Tax Rate of the Manufacturers 
As follows from (6), (20), (22) and (25), the second period income function of a 
manufacturer can be written more explicitly,    
ݕ௧ାଵெ = ݄௧ାଵߠ	ܭ௧ାଵఈ ሺߜ௧ାଵெ ݄௧ାଵሻఏିଵܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ݄௧ାଵሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻ + ሺ1 −
߬௧ெሻܾ௧ெሾߙܭ௧ାଵఈିଵሺߜ௧ାଵெ ݄௧ାଵሻఏܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ݄௧ାଵሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻሿ  
The cost of increasing human capital is the increase in the tax rate. Following from (15), 
we can express the second period physical capital investment as;  
 ܭ௧ାଵ = ሺ1 − ߬௧ெሻ	ܽܳ௧	                                                                                                                  
Since ݄௧ାଵ = ݄ሺ݁௧ሻ and as follows from (16), the efficiency units of human capital 
function can be written as   
݄௧ାଵ = ݄ሺ݁௧ሻ = ݄ሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻ                                                                                                            
Now we can rewrite the second period income function of the manufacturers as 
ݕ௧ାଵெ =
ൣߠሺ1 −
߬௧ெሻఈሺܽܳ௧ሻఈሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఈିఉାఈఉାఏఉሻሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻఏିଵܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻሿ +
ሾߙܾ௧ெሺ1 −
߬௧ெሻఈሺܽܳ௧ሻఈିଵሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఈିఉାఈఉାఏఉሻሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻఏܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻሿ   
Simplifying this expression further;  
ݕ௧ାଵெ =
ሺ1 −
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߬௧ெሻఈሺܽܳ௧ሻఈሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఈିఉାఈఉାఏఉሻሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻఏܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻሾሺߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵሻ +
ሺߙܾ௧ெሺ	ܽܳ௧ሻିଵሻሿ                                                                                                                           
Now, we can take the derivative of the second period income function with respect to the 
preferred tax rate of the manufacturers, 	߬௧ெ, and get both the benefit and the cost of 
supporting human capital accumulation for the manufacturers.     
డ௬೟శభಾ
డఛ೟ಾ
=
ሺ1 −
߬௧ெሻఈሺܽܳ௧ሻఈሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఈିఉାఈఉାఏఉሻሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻఏܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻሼ൜ሾሺ1 −
ߙ − ߚ + ߙߚ + ߠߚሻ݄ᇱሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵሿ − ሾߙሺ1 − ߬௧ெሻିଵሿ +
൤ߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾ
	൨ +
൤ሺ1 − ߚሻሺ1 − ߙ − ߠሻሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିଵ డఋ
ಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾ
	൨ൠ ሾሺߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵሻ + ሺߙܾ௧ெሺ	ܽܳ௧ሻିଵሻሿ −
൤ߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଶ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾ
	൨ሽ	    
Therefore,    
డ௬೟శభಾ
డఛ೟ಾ
= 0 implies that in the following equation,             
ቊ൜ሾሺ1 − ߙ − ߚ + ߙߚ + ߠߚሻ݄ᇱሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵሿ − ሾߙሺ1 − ߬௧ெሻିଵሿ +
൤ߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾ
	൨ +
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൤ሺ1 − ߚሻሺ1 − ߙ − ߠሻሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିଵ డఋ
ಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾ
	൨ൠ ሾሺߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵሻ + ሺߙܾ௧ெሺ	ܽܳ௧ሻିଵሻሿ −
൤ߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଶ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾ
	൨ቋ = 0	    
Hence the tax rate preferred by the manufacturers satisfies the following equation,  
൜ሾሺ1 − ߙ − ߚ + ߙߚ + ߠߚሻ݄ᇱሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵሿ + ൤ߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾ
	൨ +
൤ሺ1 − ߚሻሺ1 − ߙ − ߠሻሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିଵ డఋ
ಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾ
	൨ൠ ሾሺߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵሻ + ሺߙܾ௧ெሺ	ܽܳ௧ሻିଵሻሿ =
ሼሾߙሺ1 − ߬௧ெሻିଵሿ	ሾሺߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵሻ + ሺߙܾ௧ெሺ	ܽܳ௧ሻିଵሻሿሽ + ൤ߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଶ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾ
	൨                                    
The tax rate satisfying the above equality, ߬௧ெ, is the tax rate which maximizes second 
period income of the manufacturers. Thus, 
߬௧ெ = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔݕ௧ାଵெ      
 
A.3. Preferred Tax Rate of the Landowners  
Following from (22) and (29) the income function of landowners in period  ݐ + 1 can be 
written as,  
 
ݕ௧ାଵ஺ =
ൣߠሺ1 −
߬௧஺ሻఈሺܽܳ௧ሻఈሾ݄ሺ߬௧஺ܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఈିఉାఈఉାఏఉሻሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻఏିଵܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻሿ +
ቂቀଵఓቁ ߛ	ܼఊ	ሺ1 − ߜ௧ାଵே − ߜ௧ାଵெ ሻଵିఊቃ                                                                                                 
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By taking the derivative of the income function of landowners in period  ݐ + 1 with 
respect to their preferred tax rate,	߬௧஺, we can obtain both the benefit and the cost of 
supporting human capital accumulation for the landowners.      
డ௬೟శభಲ
డఛ೟ಲ = 0 implies that  
ߠሺ1 −
߬௧஺ሻఈሺܽܳ௧ሻఈሾ݄ሺ߬௧஺ܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఈିఉାఈఉାఏఉሻሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻఏିଵܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻ ൜ሾሺ1 −
ߙ − ߚ + ߙߚ + ߠߚሻ݄ᇱሺ߬௧஺ܽܳ௧ሻሾ݄ሺ߬௧஺ܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵሿ − ሾߙሺ1 − ߬௧஺ሻିଵሿ +
൤ሺߠ − 1ሻሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಲ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಲ
	൨ + ൤ሺ1 − ߚሻሺ1 − ߙ − ߠሻሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିଵ డఋ
ಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಲ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಲ
	൨ൠ +
ቂቀଵఓቁ ሺ1 − ߛሻߛ	ܼఊሺ1 − ߜ௧ାଵே − ߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିఊ
డఋಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಲ,ே,௓൯
డఛ೟ಲ 	
డఋಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಲ,ே,௓൯
డఛ೟ಲ 	ቃ = 0                                    
    The tax rate satisfying this equality, ߬௧஺, is the tax rate which maximizes the second 
period income of the landowners. Hence,  
߬௧஺ = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔݕ௧ାଵ஺      
 
A.4. Preferred Tax Rate of the Natural Resource Owners  
As follows from (24) and (31),   
ݕ௧ାଵே = ݓ൫ܳ௧,߬௧ே, ܰ, ܼ൯ + ሺ1 − ߬௧ேሻ	ܾ௧ே	ܴ൫ܳ௧,߬௧ே, ܰ, ܼ൯ + ሺܰ/ߪሻ	ݒ൫ܳ௧,߬௧ே, ܰ, ܼ൯  
Following from (15), (16), (22) and Section A.2 in the Appendix, we can write ݕ௧ାଵே  as,   
ݕ௧ାଵே =
ൣሺ1 − ߚሻܰఉሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିఉ		ሾ݄ሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఉሻ൧ +
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ൣߙܾ௧ேሺ1 −
߬௧ேሻఈሺܽܳ௧ሻఈିଵሾ݄ሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሿሺఏሻሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻఏܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻሾ݄ሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఈିఏሻሺଵିఉሻሿ +
ሾቀଵఙቁߚ	ܰఉሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻଵିఉ		ሾ݄ሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఉሻሿ   
This expression can be simplified as in the following equation, 
ݕ௧ାଵே = ሼܰఉሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିఉ		ሾ݄ሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఉሻ ቂሺ1 − ߚሻ + ቀଵఙቁߚߜ௧ାଵே ቃሽ + ሼߙܾ௧ேሺ1 −
߬௧ேሻఈሺܽܳ௧ሻఈିଵሾ݄ሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఈିఉାఈఉାఏఉሻሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻఏܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻሽ  
Taking the derivative of the second period income function of the natural resource 
owners with respect to their preferred tax rate, ߬௧ே, gives us the following equation, 
డ௬೟శభಿ
డఛ೟ಿ
= 0 implies that 
൜	ܰఉሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିఉ	ሾ݄ሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఉሻሼ൤ቀ−ߚ	 డఋ
ಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಿ ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಿ
ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିଵቁ +
൫ሺ1 − ߚሻ	݄ᇱሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሾ݄ሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵ൯ቃ ቂሺ1 − ߚሻ + ቀଵఙቁ ߚߜ௧ାଵே ቃ + ሾቀ
ଵ
ఙቁ ߚ
డఋಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಿ ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಿ
ሿൠ +
ሼߙܾ௧ேሺ1 −
߬௧ேሻఈ	ሾ݄ሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఈିఉାఈఉାఏఉሻ	ሺܽܳ௧ሻఈିଵ	ܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻఏ 	൜ሾሺ1 −
ߙ − ߚ + ߙߚ + ߠߚሻ݄ᇱሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሾ݄ሺ߬௧ேܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵሿ − ሾߙሺ1 − ߬௧ேሻିଵ	ሿ +
൤ߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಿ ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಿ
	൨ + ൤ሺ1 − ߚሻሺ1 − ߙ − ߠሻሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିଵ డఋ
ಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಿ ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಿ
	൨ൠሽ = 0  
Hence, in order to satisfy the above equality and maximize the income of the natural 
resource owners in period ݐ + 1, it requires a tax rate, 	߬௧ே, higher than the tax rate 
preferred by the manufacturers,	߬௧ெ.    
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Then, ߬௧ே = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔݕ௧ାଵே    
߬௧ே =
ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔൣݓ൫ܳ௧,߬௧ே, ܰ, ܼ൯ + ሺ1 − ߬௧ேሻ	ܾ௧ே	ܴ൫ܳ௧,߬௧ே, ܰ, ܼ൯ + ሺܰ/ߪሻ	ݒ൫ܳ௧,߬௧ே, ܰ, ܼ൯൧    
Therefore, the tax rate, ߬௧ே, maximizing the second period income of natural resource 
owners also satisfies the following condition,  
߬௧ே ൐ ߬௧ெ = ߬௧∗ ൐ 	 ߬௧஺	       
 
A.5. Preferred Tax Policy of the Manufacturers-Natural Resource Owners Coalition   
The political coalition of manufacturers and natural resource owners will prefer a tax 
rate,	߬௧ெே, which maximizes their joint second period income. The simulation results 
imply that following from (24) and (33), the joint second period income function can be 
written as  
 ݕ௧ାଵெே = ሾݓሺܳ௧, ߬௧ெே, ܰ, ܼሻ + ሺ1 − ߬௧ெேሻܾ௧ெܴሺܳ௧, ߬௧ெே, ܰ, ܼሻሿ + ሾݓ൫ܳ௧,߬௧ெே, ܰ, ܼ൯ +
															ሺ1 − ߬௧ெேሻ	ܾ௧ே	ܴ൫ܳ௧,߬௧ெே, ܰ, ܼ൯ + ቀேఙቁ 	ݒ൫ܳ௧,߬௧ெே, ܰ, ܼ൯ሿ    
Taking the derivative of the second period income function of the manufacturers - natural 
resource owners coalition with respect to their preferred tax rate, ߬௧ெே, gives us the 
following equation, 
డ௬೟శభಾಿ
డఛ೟ಾಿ
= 0 implies that 
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൜	ܰఉሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିఉ	ሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெேܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఉሻሼ൤ቀ−ߚ	 డఋ
ಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾಿ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾಿ
ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିଵቁ +
൫ሺ1 − ߚሻ	݄ᇱሺ߬௧ெேܽܳ௧ሻሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெேܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵ൯ቃ ቂሺ1 − ߚሻ + ቀଵఙቁߚߜ௧ାଵே ቃ +
ሾቀଵఙቁߚ
డఋಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾಿ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾಿ
ሿൠ +
ሺ1 −
߬௧ெேሻఈሺܽܳ௧ሻఈሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெேܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఈିఉାఈఉାఏఉሻሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻఏܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻ ቊ൜ሾሺ1 −
ߙ − ߚ + ߙߚ + ߠߚሻ݄ᇱሺ߬௧ெேܽܳ௧ሻሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெேܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵሿ − ሾߙሺ1 − ߬௧ெேሻିଵሿ +
൤ߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾಿ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾಿ
	൨ +
൤ሺ1 − ߚሻሺ1 − ߙ − ߠሻሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିଵ డఋ
ಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾಿ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾಿ
	൨ൠ ሾሺߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵሻ + ሺߙܾ௧ெሺ	ܽܳ௧ሻିଵሻ +
ሺߙܾ௧ேሺ	ܽܳ௧ሻିଵሻሿ − ൤ߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଶ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾಿ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾಿ
	൨ቋ = 0  
The tax rate satisfying the above equality, ߬௧ெே, is the tax rate which maximizes second 
period income of the manufacturers – natural resource owners coalition members.  
Then, ߬௧ெே = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔݕ௧ାଵெே    
 
A.6. Preferred Tax Policy of the Manufacturers-Landowners Coalition   
The second period income function of the coalition, (35), can also be written as the 
following 
ݕ௧ାଵெ஺ = ሾݓሺܳ௧, ߬௧ெ஺, ܰ, ܼሻ + ሺ1 − ߬௧ெ஺ሻܾ௧ெܴሺܳ௧, ߬௧ெ஺, ܰ, ܼሻሿ + ሾݓ൫ܳ௧,߬௧ெ஺, ܰ, ܼ൯ +
															ݏ஺ݔሺܳ௧, ߬௧ெ஺, ܰ, ܼሻሿ  
88 
 
The political coalition of manufacturers and landowners will implement a tax policy for 
human capital accumulation using the tax rate,	߬௧ெ஺, such as maximizing their second 
period income as in the following equation,      
డ௬೟శభಾಲ
డఛ೟ಾಲ
= 0 implies that  
ሺ1 −
߬௧ெ஺ሻఈ	ሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெ஺ܽܳ௧ሻሿሺଵିఈିఉାఈఉାఏఉሻ	ሺܽܳ௧ሻఈ	ܰఉሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఈିఏሻ	ሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻఏሼ	൜ሾሺ1 −
ߙ − ߚ + ߙߚ + ߠߚሻ݄ᇱሺ߬௧ெ஺ܽܳ௧ሻ	ሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெ஺ܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵሿ − ሾߙሺ1 − ߬௧ெ஺ሻିଵ	ሿ +
൤ߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾಲ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾಲ
	൨ +
൤ሺ1 − ߚሻሺ1 − ߙ − ߠሻሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିଵ డఋ
ಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾಲ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾಲ
	൨ ሾሺߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵሻ + ሺߙܾ௧ெሺ	ܽܳ௧ሻିଵሻሿ −
൤ߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଶ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾ
	൨ൠ +
ሼሾߠሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵሿ ൜ሾሺ1 − ߙ − ߚ + ߙߚ + ߠߚሻ݄ᇱሺ߬௧ெ஺ܽܳ௧ሻሾ݄ሺ߬௧ெ஺ܽܳ௧ሻሿିଵሿ − ሾߙሺ1 −
߬௧ெ஺ሻିଵሿ + ൤ሺߠ − 1ሻሺߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିଵ డఋ
ಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾಲ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾಲ
	൨ +
൤ሺ1 − ߚሻሺ1 − ߙ − ߠሻሺߜ௧ାଵே ሻିଵ డఋ
ಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾಲ,ே,௓൯	
డఛ೟ಾಲ
	൨ൠሽ + ቂቀଵఓቁ ሺ1 − ߛሻߛ	ܼఊሺ1 − ߜ௧ାଵே −
ߜ௧ାଵெ ሻିఊ డఋ
ಿ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾಲ,ே,௓൯
డఛ೟ಾಲ 	
డఋಾ൫ொ೟,ఛ೟ಾಲ,ே,௓൯
డఛ೟ಾಲ 	ቃ = 0  
 
Therefore, ߬௧ெ஺ is the tax rate maximizing the second period income of the manufacturers 
– landowners coalition members, so 
߬௧ெ஺ = ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔݕ௧ାଵெ஺   
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And, ߬௧ெ஺ = ߬௧ெ = ߬௧∗   , and following (26), (27), (28) 
߬௧ெ஺ ≡ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔܳ௧ାଵ   , and   
߬௧ே ൐ ߬௧ெே ൐ ߬௧ெ஺ = 	 ߬௧ெ = ߬௧∗ ൐ 	 ߬௧஺  
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